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
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Italy's Problems *and* Achievements



With an Introduction by
WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER

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Italy's Problems *and* Achievements

Fernando Quirino, comp.



With an Introduction by
WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER

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COMPILED BY
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CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION <i>William Roscoe Thayer</i>	1
ADDRESS BEFORE THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION <i>Count Macchi di Cellere</i>	5
AUSTRIA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR . <i>Charles Upson Clark</i>	10
TREACHERY AGAINST ITALY DURING THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE <i>Arthur Bennington</i>	14
THE ASPIRATIONS OF ITALY AND THE RIGHTS OF CIVILIZATION <i>Arnaldo Agnelli</i>	28
ITALY'S EFFORT. <i>Paul Deschanel</i>	44
ITALY'S CLAIM TO ISTRIA <i>Charles Upson Clark</i>	46
PUTTING ALBANIA BACK ON THE MAP . . <i>Amy A. Bernardy</i>	52
DALMATIA, <u>FIUME</u> AND THE OTHER UNREDEEMED LANDS OF THE ADRIATIC <i>Idea Nazionale</i>	61
ITALY AT THE PIAVE <i>Diana Watts</i>	86
ITALY AND THE WAR <i>Emilio Guglielmotti</i>	95
THE BATTLE FOR VENICE <i>Walter Littlefield</i>	100
THE PROBLEMS OF VICTORY <i>Medill McCormick</i>	105
ITALY AND THE REAL VILLAIN. <i>Will Irwin</i>	108



INTRODUCTION

BY WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER

The articles which follow ought to give American readers a much better idea than they now have, of the great service which Italy has rendered to the cause of civilization, during the present war. This is well, for Italy has been the most misjudged of all the Allies. From the beginning of the war, at the end of July, 1914, the world misunderstood her position, and the Germans spread lies about it and calumniated her. The truth, known to a few then, ought to be clear to all now.

Italy could not join the Allies, or go to war at all, because her recent campaign in Africa had exhausted her munitions and supplies, and made it necessary to remodel and equip her army. This work required eight months. But, at the very start, she gave immediate help to the utmost of her power by informing the French Government that she would not fight on the side of the Teutons. This was of immense military service, because it released the French army corps watching the Italian frontier, and the moral service was, and is, and will be, of prime importance—because it meant that Italy, knowing much of the secret intrigues preceding the outbreak of hostilities, declared that the Germans were bent on a war of conquest and aggression.

Italy, it must be remembered, had been for thirty-two years a partner of Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance, and when she refused to join their piratical campaign, they charged her with backsliding and treachery. Article VII, of the Triple Alliance pact, however, distinctly stated that the partners should aid each other only in case they were *attacked*; no aggression against foreign nations was contemplated by them. With this clause standing within everyone's knowledge, we wonder why

the Germans took the trouble to lie about it; the only answer to this question is that lying is the natural expression of the German spirit.

During the winter of 1914-15, Italy prepared for war. She was also beset by German and other emissaries who urged her to declare for the Allies, or for the Entente, or to remain neutral. The Germans sent their most efficient pander, Prince Bülow, who alternately tempted and threatened. He even offered to hand over the Trentine and Trieste, with or without Austria's consent, if Italy would keep out of the war. She had, meanwhile, great internal difficulties. The Socialists, there as elsewhere, were secretly Pro-German; the Papalists and some of the high nobility were likewise pro-German; the new Pope, Benedict XV, was believed to side with the Teutons, and neither his actions nor his public messages dispelled this suspicion. The emperors of Germany and Austria had promised him, it was said, to restore the Temporal Power of the Popes, and this matter was publically discussed and approved in the Bavarian Diet. A large part of the Italian populace was lukewarm; it saw no profit in entering the war; neither did many of the deputies and politicians, who had been for years manipulated by Giolitti, the most wily politician United Italy had ever had, and one who was supposed to be, politically and personally, in the favor of the Germans.

But there was a saving remnant which represented the intelligence and conscience of Italy, and this remnant gradually led the country to perceive that, in a war between barbarism and civilization, Italy must do her duty and fight the barbarians. So she broke with Austria on May 24, 1915. Then began her active, military assistance. Her campaigns for two years in the Alps, and along the Isonzo, were among the marvels of military ingenuity, fortitude, and heroism. In 1916 she declared war on Germany also, having been obliged to delay so long because the Germans had "peacefully penetrated" northern Italy to such an extent that they controlled most of its industries and commerce.

Italy's cooperation with the Allies kept a considerable portion of the Austrian army busy. It was also of great value to the French and English in the Mediterranean. Had Italy gone with the Teutons, her fleet might have menaced Marseilles and other French ports, and her submarines would have done great damage to the English and French transports. Her own southern harbors would have sheltered the Teutonic submarines and cruisers.

I do not expatiate on the splendid endurance of the Italians during the war. The civil population saw their food diminish and their fuel disappear, but, like the soldiers, they bore the privations and the losses without complaint. The Italians have always been a long-suffering people. In this war, what troubled the soldiers more than their own hunger was the thought that their wives and children, at home, were unprovided for; and the reptilian agents of the Kaiser played upon their anxiety. Many elements contributed to the disaster at Caporette, on October 27, 1917—war weariness, the Pope's peace message, the seditious enticements of the Socialists, the open intrigues of German spies, the treachery of a few officers, the growing belief among the army that the United States and the Allies had abandoned Italy to her fate. To me, the wonder is, not that the disaster came, but that the fugitive Italian army corps had strength and courage to stop at the Piave, to turn on their pursuers, and to hold there until they could make further pursuit impossible.

During the winter and spring of 1918, the Italian army, stiffened by several corps of French and English troops, prepared to repel the expected onslaught of the Austrians. This came in June, and the Italians drove the enemy back, saved Venice from danger, and stood ready to advance to their former frontiers when Marshal Foch should give the word. This is a splendid example of recovery by a nation which had been beaten.

Italy, we must remember, lacks both coal and iron, the two staples on which our modern industrial civilization and our modern warfare depend. We must remember, also, that she has been, in spite of her hard-working popu-

lation, a poor country. Now she has redeemed herself and proved her right to stand among the Great Powers. Like the United States she entered the war on the side of the Allies, of her own free will. It would have been as hideous if she, the nation which was built by Mazzini and Victor Emmanuel, Garibaldi and Cavour, had denied her birthright and the ideals of her great founders, had joined the Huns, as if this mightiest of all republics, ark of liberty, had foresworn its conscience and fought under the black and red pirate flag of despotism.

ADDRESS BEFORE THE NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, JANUARY 12, 1918

BY HIS EXCELLENCY, COUNT MACCHI DI CELLERE
Italian Ambassador to the United States

Sir Frederick Smith, the Attorney General of Great Britain, in his brilliant words to you last night discussed the problems that will confront us at the close of this great war. This afternoon at the Lawyers' Club he was gracious enough to speak briefly and clearly of one or two of the features which have marked the place which my nation has taken in the struggle. For this exposition by him of our stand and for his clear statement of the appreciation that his great nation has of the value of Italy's contribution to the Allied Cause, I thank him.

We are all joint partners in this great fight against the forces of armed brutality. It is of the highest importance that we should all appreciate to the full the unselfishness and purity of purpose of each of our associates. The magnificent and unselfish stand which the United States has taken for the preservation of democracy by its entry into war is fully realized by my nation. And it is with the hope that I may make clear and distinct to you the unselfishness and purity of purpose of Italy that I undertake in a few words to recall to you her situation. Italy's position in this war has been perverted into one of faithlessness by a clever propaganda of our common enemy; but, fortunately, your great President and you and others of the people of the United States have come to recognize that this accusation is hideously false. This German propaganda has centered around two points: That we were

traitors to the Triple Alliance; that we entered the war only for selfish ends. How far from justified are these two accusations, with all the consequences that follow them, you know. I will, however, discuss them from the Italian point of view. I could easily disregard the accusation of treason made by our enemies against us. The word treason is unknown to Italy in principle and in fact, and only Teutonic mentality could apply it to us. Italy did not betray her former allies. She was brutally and repeatedly betrayed by them. One needs merely to consider the spirit and the wording of the treaty of the Triple Alliance to be at once convinced of the truth of my statement. Italy joined the Austro-German combination at a period when her national existence had hardly begun. Unable to withstand the dangers of isolation, Italy became a party to the treaty, but stipulated that the Alliance should be purely defensive and that no step whatever should be taken by any of the signatories without previous consultation with the others. Italy kept her word to the last. How the Teutonic powers kept theirs is demonstrated by their sending their ultimatum to Serbia without even letting Italy know that they were contemplating such a tremendous step. They kept Italy in the dark because they knew by experience that Italy would oppose their plans of aggression against Serbia or any other nation, and they realized that if their plans had been known in time the war they wanted to provoke and did provoke would not have been possible. Italy had stood by Serbia when, after Austria's annexation of the Serbian provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Central Powers were preparing new aggressions in the Balkans and were looking for pretexts which Italy's attitude always forestalled. Knowing that Italy would never consent to their criminal plans, Germany and Austria prepared in secret. When they considered themselves ready, they broke the peace of the world. What Italy's attitude would have been if she had known what the Central Powers were preparing is demonstrated by the efforts she made with her noble and tradi-

tional friend England to prevent a war which everybody knew would be the ruin of Europe and would involve the whole of the world. Our efforts were as vain as were those of England, because the crimes which the Central Powers were plotting against humanity and civilization had been determined upon. Italy was betrayed by her former allies in 1908, when Austria with the knowledge and open support of Germany annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina; she was betrayed again during her war with Turkey in 1912, when Austria threatened instant war if Italy should attack Turkey at Prevesa, and when Germany sent her officers and men to lead the Turks and the Arabs against the Italian soldiers; she was betrayed once more in 1914, when Germany and Austria struck without consulting her. Italy did the only thing she could possibly do at the time—she refused to join them, and at once declared her neutrality.

The history of Italy, even in its darkest periods, abounds in instances of nobility and greatness. The Italian nation could not have become a party to a crime against humanity—a crime so cunningly premeditated that the most repulsive crimes of all suffer in comparison.

The Teutonic assault on Serbia had released Italy from any obligation under the Triple Alliance—an assault which was only the consummation of a series of crimes all preparatory to the same end, and committed in full view of the civilized world, which nevertheless could not be brought to realize what was about to happen.

We are all paying dearly now for our blind faith that no nation would dare to break a peace which the world had expended so much to secure.

Let me say, gentlemen, that in the bloody sacrifices civilization is making to overthrow barbarism once for all, Italy is second to none.

But then (to take up the second point of my argument against the subtle Teutonic propaganda) why did Italy merely declare her neutrality instead of immediately taking up arms and joining the Entente in August, 1914? All who follow the course of international affairs appreciate the fact

that in 1914 Italy was just emerging from a war with Turkey, in which she had suffered atrociously as a result of Turkish cruelty and Austro-German treason.

I have already referred to the episode of Prevesa and the fact established by official documents that German officers and men took part on the Turkish side in the Italo-Turkish war. Our military stores were exhausted, our artillery was reduced to nothing, our armies had been largely disbanded, and only a very small number of them remained under arms. The result to the Allies of an immediate Italian participation in the war, under these conditions, is easily seen. Italy would have been overrun at once, put out of business altogether, and lost to the cause of the Allies probably forever—certainly for the duration of this war.

However, the mere declaration of neutrality was, in itself, a proof that Italy had made her decision—she would not be on the side of the aggressors. But it meant far more; it meant that heroic France, reassured about our attitude, could, as she did, immediately withdraw all of her soldiers from the Italian frontier and send them to immortalize themselves at the Marne. Thus Italy, by making possible the victorious defense of Paris, contributed in saving the war for the Allies.

The Central Powers understood what Italian neutrality meant, and began a work of corruption and intrigue which did not, however, alter the course of events. Italy had not been ready when the voice of history called her to be true to her immemorial traditions of love for liberty and justice; but she prepared with all speed to make her participation in the war of material advantage. You all know of what technical importance has been Italy's contribution to the war, in the perfecting of trench, mountain and heavy artillery, in the wonderful evolution of the aeroplane, in the development of warfare among the clouds.

But let me recall to your minds the immediate practical effects of Italy's entrance into the struggle.

Russia was being rapidly driven back, apparently without any hope of recovering from the hammering blows of the Austro-German forces. Only a diversion, and a power-

ful one, could prevent a crushing disaster to the Allies. Italy undertook the task of creating such a diversion. She declared war on Austria, crossed old *iniquitous boundaries imposed upon her* by Austria and Germany in 1866, and forced the instant transfer of all available Austrian forces from the Eastern theatre of the war to the Italian front. Italy had created the necessary diversion and Russia was saved for her victories of a few months later.

For two and a half years Austria had been kept on the verge of disaster by the bravery of a country that has been paying for her lack of artillery, ammunition, fuel and food with the purest blood of her sons.

Then last October, owing to a combination of circumstances now known to all, Teutonic trickery and violence got the better of us. Our country was invaded, our army brought near destruction, our monuments razed with barbaric thoroughness, our women and children martyred. For the moment it seemed that we were lost, not only to the cause of the Allies, but even to our own traditions. Thank God that impression proved false! Never was Italy so great as the day she realized her danger and transformed what appeared to be one of the greatest defeats known in military annals into a victorious rally of all her forces against the invader. The day will come when we shall hear the name of the Piave mentioned in the same breath with that of the Marne, thus uniting in a halo of glory the two greatest episodes in the history of those nations which are shedding their blood in the cause of true civilization. Of this we are assured by the miraculous revival of the fighting spirit of our soldiers and by the evidence that our country is fully aware of the part history has called upon her to play for the triumph of those principles of justice which the world originally learned from Italy.

With this faith in our destiny, with the assurance that right cannot be permanently destroyed by might, with the confidence and gratitude that the entrance of this glorious republic in the war on our side has added her sense of right and her unlimited strength, we face the future bravely, certain that victory will be ours.

AUSTRIA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

BY PROF. CHARLES UPSON CLARK

Of the American Academy in Rome

We are apt to forget two fundamental facts with regard to the present conflict: First, that it is a Balkan war to settle Serbia's status, and second, that Austria precipitated it. In our indignation at Germany's conduct of the war, we neglect to bear in mind Austria's maneuvers during the past decade; and as several of them seem not to be well known in this country, I shall rehearse them, taking full advantage of the interesting recollections of Senator Tittoni,¹ the former Italian Foreign Secretary, and later Ambassador at Paris.

This war is a sequel of Austria's seizure, in 1908, of the former Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had been administering under the treaty of Berlin (1878). This action was a warning to Serbia, if one was needed, that Austria was seeking expansion in that direction, but consternation at Austria's cynical infraction of the Treaty of Berlin was almost as great at Rome. Under article VII of the Triple Alliance, if either Austria or Italy obtained further territorial aggrandizement in the Balkans, the other country had a right to compensation. The Italian Foreign Office was very anxious to avoid a controversy with Austria, but felt that Italy's rights must be safeguarded, and that various clauses in the Treaty of Berlin should be revised. England was worried over Austria's mobilization against Serbia, and in February, 1909, Sir Charles Hardings and Minister Tittoni sounded Berlin with regard to a confer-

¹Il Giudizio della Storia sulla responsabilit  della guerra. Senatore Tommaso Tittoni—Milan—Treves.

ence. Germany replied that she was prepared to support Austria in any step Austria might take. Thereupon Minister Tittoni proposed to England and Russia an international conference, which should sanction the treaty between Austria and Turkey in reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina, should recognize Bulgaria's independence of the Porte, and should discuss certain clauses of the Treaty of Berlin. When news of this proposed conference leaked out, it was saluted with joy even by the *Lokal-Anzeiger* and *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of Berlin, the *Reichspost*, *Vaterland* and *Zeit* of Vienna, and the *Pester Lloyd* of Buda-Pesth; and Europe, in general, breathed a sigh of relief. In fact, on March 15, 1909, the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary notified Minister Tittoni that, while not speaking officially, they were personally well disposed towards the proposed conference, and France and Russia were heartily in favor of it. Suddenly, without a word of warning, Berlin notified St. Petersburg that Russia must immediately recognize Austria's annexation of these Turkish provinces, without waiting for any conference, otherwise war should be declared. It was a bitter humiliation for the Russian government; Russia was official protector of the Balkan Slavs and her prestige was deeply involved. But Russia, as Germany well understood, was not ready for war, and had to swallow the affront; on March 23, she notified Germany that she acknowledged Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Having succeeded in her brutal bluff with Russia, Germany decided that Italy's turn came next. On March 25, Minister Tittoni had just entered the Foreign Office and was at the window enjoying the early sunlight on the marble group before the Quirinal and the Dome of St. Peter's through the luminous morning mist, when the German Ambassador was announced. He gravely notified Minister Tittoni that he had come to make a statement of the utmost importance. His government had charged him to demand from Italy the immediate recog-

nition of Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In vain did Minister Tittoni protest that a conference would shortly decide the question. Baron Monts replied that a conference was now unnecessary since Russia had already recognized the legality of Austria's action. To this Minister Tittoni objected that he had received no word from Russia and that in any case he had formally declared in the Italian Chamber that Italy could sanction Austria's action only if it were accompanied by certain modifications in the Treaty of Berlin. Thereupon Baron Monts asked the fateful question: "Is that your last word?" Minister Tittoni, fully realizing that he was pledging Italy to stand by Serbia even to the point of war with Germany, had just replied that it was his last word, when Count Lutzow, the Austrian Ambassador, was shown in. He was more conciliatory, and at once admitted that article XXIX of the Treaty of Berlin should be modified; negotiations to that end were initiated; and Germany rested satisfied with her humiliation of Russia.

It would be instructive to compare this action of Germany's with that in the Agadir affair, but it is more germane to our present purpose to follow Minister Tittoni in remarking the extraordinary similarity to her procedure in July, 1914. Again the Powers had nearly succeeded in calling an international conference to prevent the spread of the Balkan war which Austria had brought on; again it was Germany which made a sudden, humiliating demand upon Russia. This demand is generally interpreted as merely a pretext trumped up by Germany for the general war which she had decided on. But it has just been pointed out by the Serbian General Vesnitch (see *New York Times* of January 1, 1918) that Count Portales had notified his home government at Berlin from St. Petersburg that revolution would break out in Russia, should the Russian army be mobilized; and there is another curious fact, noted at the time but since forgotten, which indicates that in 1914 also, Germany expected that her threat would suffice, and that

she might again be acknowledged mistress of European politics, while biding her time for the great reckoning which most careful students of European affairs expected in 1916 or 1917. When Count Portales came to send the official note declaring war to the Russian Foreign Office, he sent, instead, the note which had previously been drawn up, expressing Germany's satisfaction at Russia's acceptance of her suggestions, and the mistake passed unnoticed for some hours. But Russia's resolution to brook no further humiliation at the hands of Germany and Austria made the Central Powers begin the conflict earlier than they had previously intended—particularly as internal politics in France and England seemed to make the moment a favorable one.

Let another instance or two bring out Austria's primary responsibility for this Balkan war. In November, 1912, Austria asked Italy to recognize Serbia's new status after the second Balkan war, but only on this condition, that Austria should be allowed to exact from Serbia certain guarantees. As always, Italy again showed herself Serbia's best friend (for it will be remembered that the policy of France in the Balkans has been *phil-Hellene*, and England broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia for some years) and answered that these guarantees must not compromise Serbia's independence, and must not be to the sole advantage of Austria. Austria made no reply, having evidently resolved on war, as will be shown later. On April 30, 1913, Tittoni (now Ambassador at Paris) received a telegram from his successor in the Italian Foreign Office, the Marquis di San Giuliano, to the effect that Austria had notified Italy that she was about to proceed against Montenegro. Tittoni telegraphed back to let Austria understand that if she occupied Montenegro, Italy, under article VII of the Triple Alliance, would proceed to the immediate occupation of the Albanian ports of Durazzo and Vallona. Foiled again, Austria notified Italy in the summer of 1913 that she desired her aid in a war against Serbia; Italy answered

that the Triple Alliance was a defensive and not an offensive combination, and that she must deplore any such action on Austria's part. So Austria postponed this long-cherished dream of gobbling up Serbia as she had Bosnia, until the summer of 1914 gave her so good a pretext. But this time she did not take Italy into her confidence.

I hope these items—Austria's illegal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, followed by Germany's application of brute force at St. Petersburg in 1909; Austria's endeavor in 1912 to humble Serbia after Serbia's successes in the second Balkan war; her plan in 1913 to annex Montenegro, and her announced intention of declaring war against Serbia one year before she finally did—are enough to show Austria's prime responsibility for the conflagration. It is well for us in America to understand not only this, but also that if the Austrian Empire survives this war, it will continue to be a disturber of the peace in the Balkans. The discussion of this, however, in the present connection, would lead us too far afield, as would also the outrageous treatment of Italy by her partners in the Triple Alliance during Italy's recent war with Turkey. Suffice it to say that no broad view of the European situation, particularly when peace negotiations come to be discussed, should leave out of account the infinite possibilities of the Austrian Empire as an anachronism and trouble maker, not only in the all too recent past, but in the grim and shadowy future which Austria's misdeeds have created for us.

TREACHERY AGAINST ITALY DURING THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE*

BY ARTHUR BENNINGTON

When the secret archives of the European chancelleries shall be opened and their contents studied by future historians, one of the darkest pages in the annals of diplomacy will be found in the true record of the Triple Alliance. Not until then can the full measure of German and Austrian perfidy and treachery be taken. Since Italy finally broke with her allies of thirty-four years, statesmen whose lips had heretofore been sealed have revealed a few of the black secrets that had been hidden behind the veil. Some of these secrets have found their way piecemeal into the columns of the press; not many, it is true, but enough to make thinking men amazed at the long-suffering meekness with which Italy kept turning the other cheek after her allies had smitten her over and over again.

In the last few months it has been the writer's privilege to have a peep behind the scenes of the Triple Alliance. I have been placed in possession of some hitherto unrevealed incidents of diplomatic history; one or two statesmen whose authority is beyond question have related them to me and given me permission to make some of them public. What follows is a brief résumé of facts of treachery on the part of Germany and Austria in their relations with their ally. Some of them have been told before and are retold today with those revealed for the first time, merely to make as complete as possible the astounding record of Teutonic perfidy.

First of all, a very brief summary of the facts of the Triple Alliance.

*Reprinted from the *New York World*, September 23, 1917.

HOW THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE WAS MADE

Italy was virtually forced into the Triple Alliance. In 1882, when the treaty was made, she was faced with many troubles, at home and abroad. France had just taken Tunisia, to which Italy had long aspired, being encouraged in her aspirations by Bismarck, who wanted to weaken France in the Mediterranean. Her relations with France had been embittered by a massacre of Italian workmen at Marseilles. Bismarck was threatening to interfere in Italy's relations with the Papacy, and his newspaper organs were busy urging that Germany step in and restore Rome to the Pope. He was also plotting to strain still further the already tense relations between Italy and France. Italy's army and navy were so small and inefficient that she dared not risk a rupture with France. Therefore, her statesmen were glad to accept the alliance with Germany and with their hereditary enemy Austria, for they wanted peace above everything else at that moment.

Germany's object in admitting a then so insignificant nation as Italy to an alliance was to offset the growing power of France in the Mediterranean and at the same time to curb Italy's hostility to Austria. This hostility manifested itself in a determination to add to the newly united Italy the Italian provinces that still remained under Austrian rule. It was especially Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia that Germany feared might be lost to Austria, thus depriving the Germanic powers of their one outlet to the Mediterranean. They figured that with Italy their ally she must give up her aspirations for the acquisition of these provinces on the Adriatic.

WHY ITALY REPEATEDLY RENEWED IT

The Italian people never loved the Triple Alliance, and though this was renewed in 1887, again in 1891 and again in 1902, its hold upon Italy became weaker and weaker as Italians saw how their allies disregarded it whenever it suited their purpose. The successive renewals of the

alliance on Italy's part were due solely to her desire to preserve the peace of Europe, for it is very difficult to discover any single benefit that Italy has ever derived from it. The world has often wondered why, in view of the repeated treachery of her allies, Italy kept on renewing the treaty of the Triple Alliance. To explain this mystery I cannot do better than quote some words from a speech made in Paris on June 22, 1916, by Signor Tittoni, who had been one of the most ardent supporters of the Triple Alliance throughout his long career:

"We were with Austria for peace, for the equilibrium of the Adriatic, to guarantee the independence and integrity of the Balkan states, and we remained faithful to her up to the moment that she, by abandoning that programme, constrained us to seek elsewhere for its effectual operation. Those of us who for many long years have loyally supported Italy's alliance with Austria, serving the cause of our country and of the peace of Europe, do not go back on our past; on the contrary, we reaffirm it loudly because that past in no way contradicts our present attitude, but is rather its efficacious justification. It is not Italy that betrayed the alliance. Austria betrayed it when she betrayed the cause of right, of justice and of peace."

It was in 1884, only two years after the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed, that Germany and Austria first violated its provisions, ignored their ally and made a secret treaty with Russia. One of the several reasons why Italy had allied herself with Germany and Austria was the desire to protect herself against Russian and Austrian aggression in the Balkans. By this bit of Machiavellian diplomacy Bismarck won the promise of Russia and Austria to maintain "benevolent neutrality" in the event of Germany becoming involved in war with France, in return for which he pledged himself to further the ambitions of Austria and Russia by "honest brokerage" in the Balkans.

The secret alliance with Russia made Italy a negligible quantity in the eyes of Bismarck and of the Austrian statesmen who danced when he pulled the strings.

THE "DOUBLE CROSS" FOR ITALY

In 1892, a year after the second renewal of the Triple Alliance, the commercial treaties which Italy had with Germany and Austria expired. These were separate and distinct treaties in no way depending upon the Triple Alliance. They were not even concurrent and the terms were different, each covering special relations between Italy and the country to which it applied. Negotiations for the renewal of these treaties went on for several months; the terms of the treaty with Germany were settled without any difficulty; Austria, on the other hand, raised objection after objection to the terms proposed to her by Italy, endeavoring to wring from her ally commercial concessions of a most onerous nature. The Marquis di Rudini, then Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs, anxious to get the treaties arranged, made some concessions, but a point was finally reached beyond which he could not yield. Vienna continued to hold out for terms that Rudini regarded as oppressive and to reject the reasonable treaty that he had submitted.

In the meantime, although the terms of the treaty with Germany had long since been agreed upon, Germany's signature ratifying the treaty was not forthcoming.

Rudini was pressing Germany to sign and pressing Austria to come to reasonable terms, when he received a despatch from the Italian Ambassador in Berlin informing him that the German Government had intimated to him that Germany would not ratify her commercial treaty until Italy should agree to Austria's terms, Germany and Austria having a secret agreement to that effect.

Thus were Italy's allies trying to squeeze her between the upper and the nether millstones and force her to agree to conditions that would put her commercially at their mercy.

CHECKMATE WITH A DOUBLE ULTIMATUM

But the Marquis di Rudini was a more astute statesman than either Berlin or Vienna gave him credit for being.

This is how he checkmated the "double cross" that had been planned for Italy by her allies:

He sent for the German and Austrian Ambassadors. The former, General Solms, was the first to arrive. The Marquis received him standing and did not ask him to take a seat. Putting his monocle into his left eye, the Italian Minister addressed the German Ambassador about as follows:

"Your Excellency, the delay in ratifying these commercial treaties is a species of blackmail on the part of the government that you represent. I now have the honor to inform you that if the pending treaty be not signed within twenty-four hours I shall tear up the Triple Alliance and announce my reasons to the rest of the world."

A few minutes later the Austrian Ambassador arrived, and the Marquis di Rudini treated him in precisely the same manner, saying:

"Your Excellency, I wish to repeat to you the words I addressed a few minutes ago to your German colleague, and to add that they apply precisely to the treaty now pending between the Government of Italy and that of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria."

Two astonished and crestfallen ambassadors left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and rushed to their respective embassies, whence the telegraph wires to Berlin and Vienna soon began to sizzle.

Before the twenty-four-hour limit had expired both Berlin and Vienna signed the treaties.

And Germany and Austria were Italy's allies!

It was round about 1904 that Austria began the elaborate fortification of the lofty mountain peaks that overlook Italy. It must be remembered that the frontier between Austria and Italy runs along the base of these mountains, they and almost all of the foothills being on the Austrian side of the line. In 1905 the Austrian Army held its grand manœuvres, at which the Emperor was present, precisely in these mountains along the Italian frontier. In this there was, of course, no breach of the

Triple Alliance, but was the kind of menace that one ally does not expect from another.

MOST FLAGRANT OF BETRAYALS

The most flagrant of all the betrayals of Italy was the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in October, 1908. How flagrant this was can best be understood by reading Article VII of the Triple Alliance. This runs as follows:

“Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial status quo in the east, engage themselves to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the powers signatory of the present treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other powers. Should, however, the case arise that in the course of events the maintenance of the status quo in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coast and islands in the Adriatic or Aegean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the status quo for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two powers, which would be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties.”

ITALY KEPT IN THE DARK

Austria gave her ally no information as to her intention to seize Bosnia and Herzegovina. Italy learned of it only when Emperor Francis Joseph, in autograph letters to the rulers of Europe, formally announced the annexation. Of all the powers, Russia was the only one to protest, but

an open threat of war from Germany silenced even this, for Russia was not yet convalescent from the war with Japan. Italy was in no condition to protest, for she was not prepared to back up a protest with force, especially as this would have meant fighting Germany as well as Austria.

No "compensations" were offered to Italy, Turkey being the only nation to which a sop was thrown. To keep Turkey quiet, Austria withdrew her troops from the Sanjak of Novibazar. Austria would not even discuss the matter with Italy, though Italy was Austria's ally.

In spite of the terms of the clause just quoted, Austria persistently fomented troubles in the Balkans and contrived to obtain whatever she wanted there without consulting Italy or offering any compensations. Thus the Kingdom of Albania was set up and a sovereign selected by Austria imposed upon it; thus was Montenegro compelled to give up Scutari and Serbia to renounce an outlet upon the Adriatic; thus was the frontier between Serbia and Greece laid out as Austria desired.

AUSTRIA PLANS TO INVADE ITALY

Two months after this seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, just when the Messina earthquake had plunged all Italy into mourning, Gen. Conrad von Hoetzendorff, Chief of Staff of the Austrian Army, proposed what he called "a military promenade" to Venice and Milan. The Crown Prince and his powerful entourage supported this plan for the invasion and reconquest of Venetia and Lombardy in Italy's hour of distress. The project was seriously discussed by the Imperial Cabinet and the General Staff; it was openly urged in the columns of the *Armee Zeitung* and other semi-official Austrian newspapers. It would probably have been adopted had it not been for the indignant opposition of Count von Aerenthal, Chancellor of the empire, who absolutely refused to countenance such a wanton and unprovoked attack upon Austria's ally.

Gen. Conrad von Hoetendorff was forced to resign, but he had the active support of the Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, and the latter had the backing of the German Emperor in the bitter campaign that began at once against Count von Aerenthal. Francis Ferdinand was always savagely anti-Italian in his sentiments, and never took any pains to conceal the fact.

And Austria was Italy's ally!

Italy's seizure of Tripoli and Cyrenaica in 1911 was forced upon her by Germany's evident preparation to take them. This territory had long been conceded as Italy's rightful heritage, and the matter had been discussed openly for several years with the leading statesmen of Europe. But Italy discovered that Germany was getting important concessions from Turkey for operations in those countries and was making vast investments there. At the same time, all Italian enterprise was being frustrated by German machinations. Italy awoke to the fact that with the eastern shores of the Adriatic Austrian, and the northern coasts of Africa German, Italy would be merely a peninsula sticking out into a German lake, and that this geographical possibility was imminent.

STABBING ITALY IN THE BACK

It was a case of taking this territory now or never. The famous visit of the German cruiser *Panther* to Agadir and the events that followed it opened Italy's eyes to the designs of her ally and aroused such popular indignation that even Giolitti, the pro-German Premier, was forced to act. And when Italy seized Tripoli, the chorus of protest that rose against her was led from Berlin.

Germany, Italy's ally, did her best to make the conquest of those Turkish provinces impossible. There is on file in the archives of the Foreign Office in Paris a despatch from Jules Cambon, then French Ambassador in Berlin, bearing date in the spring or early summer of 1912—a despatch so sensational that it has never yet been made public.

I cannot quote the text of the message, for this has been seen by very few persons—probably not more than twenty

in all. But it recounts an incident that would have "created a profound impression," as the diplomats say, had its contents been known in Rome at that time.

It was just before the close of the war between Italy and Turkey. At this time Turkey was helpless, ready to give up and allow Italy to take Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the last of Turkey's African possessions.

Ambassador Cambon's despatch related that during a conference that morning between him and the German Emperor at Potsdam, an aide-de-camp sent word to the Emperor that the Turkish Ambassador was there, requesting an audience. The Kaiser directed that the caller be shown in at once, and remarked to Ambassador Cambon that this was just the man he wanted to see. M. Cambon asked if he should retire. The Emperor said no. The Turk was shown into the room where the French Ambassador still sat. The Emperor rushed to meet the caller, shook a quivering finger before his face, and cried:

"I am ashamed of you! I am ashamed of Turkey! We believed that you could beat the Italians; had we not thought so we should not have backed you. Now we see we put our money on the wrong horse!"

There was more to the same effect, and the poor Turkish Ambassador stood there vainly trying to excuse his country for having obtained Germany's backing and then been defeated by Italy, but the Emperor was very excited and indignant and the Turk had not much opportunity to talk.

THOUGHT THE KAISER WAS MAD

This was intensely interesting to the French Ambassador, who took no part in the conversation, but made a mental note of every word spoken by Italy's august ally to the Ambassador of Italy's enemy. And when he left the place, M. Cambon lost no time in telegraphing a detailed account of the conversation to which he had virtually been invited to listen, adding a comment to this effect:

"That the Emperor in my presence should have spoken so openly of the backing Germany had been giving to

the enemy of her ally seems explicable only on the assumption that His Majesty is losing or has lost his mind."

Thus France, Germany's hereditary enemy, was allowed to know that Germany had been supporting Turkey in her war against Italy, Germany's ally, a fact that was carefully concealed from Italy.

But though the Italian Government did not know that Germany was playing traitor, it suspected that Turkey was receiving support of many kinds from Germany. In their campaign against the Arabs the Italian soldiers repeatedly obtained what to them was certain evidence that the enemy was led by German officers. They reported this to Rome, but were unable to substantiate their convictions by incontestable proof. The Italian Ambassador in Berlin was informed of the suspicion that officers of the German Army were in Africa leading the Arabs against the forces of Germany's ally and was directed to watch for direct proof. This was not forthcoming for some time, but at last it came, and from a source as authoritative as it was unexpected. It was nothing less than an official bulletin of the German War Department in the form of a list of officers to whom pensions had been granted; this contained the names of many officers pensioned because of wounds received in service in Tripoli against Italy.

And Germany was Italy's ally!

THE FATAL ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

The Italian Ambassador sent copies of this bulletin to Rome, where the newspaper organ of the Nationalist Party, *L'Idea Nazionale*, published a facsimile of it as one of its strong arguments in urging the government to denounce the Triple Alliance and join forces with the Entente Allies in declaring war upon Germany.

Another instance of Germany's secret support of the Arabs against Italy was the discovery that Herr von Lochow, the supposed gentleman farmer of the oasis of

Gurgi, was a German officer in disguise and that his residence was really an arsenal full of rifles and ammunition.

Austria capped the climax of her utter disregard for the explicit provisions of the Triple Alliance when she served her fatal ultimatum upon Serbia on July 23, 1914, without consulting Italy or informing her of her intentions.

And after the European war broke out and Italy, unable then to take an active part in it because her military and naval munitions were practically exhausted, had declared her neutrality, Germany roused Tripolitania to rebellion against Italy.

Pro-German propagandists here and in Europe have cried aloud about the terrible wrong that would be committed against the Slav majority of the population of Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia if they were transferred from Austrian to Italian rule. But the story of how these provinces came to have a Slav majority and of the Austrian efforts to magnify the apparent size of this Slav population, makes the matter appear in a very different light. In 1866 these districts were Italian by race, by language and by tradition. If there were any doubt about this it would be set at rest by the fact that in the Austrian laws regulating their government they were officially called the "Italian Districts," and by a reading of Meyer's "*Die roemisch-byzantische Municipalfassung in Istrien und Damaltien*," a book that can scarcely be accused of pro-Italian prejudice!

Austria's domination over most of them began only in 1815. Austria obtained Istria only by the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797. Until 1813 Trieste was an autonomous Italian commune, though nominally tributary to Austria.

There had been a sporadic migration of Slavs into these Italian territories for several centuries, but the deliberate systematic process of turning them from Italian to Slav became energetic in 1890.

A PROTEST FROM THE PEOPLE

On January 5, 1899, all the Deputies of the provincial district of Gorizia, Istria and Trieste, and all the "podesta" of all the towns assembled in the City Hall of Trieste and signed a formal protest against the "manifest effort to denaturalize the education of our people even from infancy," by depriving the schools of text books in Italian and of teachers educated in Italian; by imposing Slav school teachers in all grades and in the colleges; "against the intrusion of Slavism into the courts, public offices and churches; against the corruption of names in maps and books," etc.

Slav priests were assigned to the churches; the Government offices, including railroad, posts and telegraphs, were filled up with Slavs; in baptismal and marriage registers and in electoral lists Italian names were changed to Slavic, despite the protests of their bearers; arsenals and barracks were filled up with Slav soldiers, and all these imported Slavs were encouraged to settle down as permanent residents of the Italian cities and towns, the vote being given to them after a three-years' residence.

Slav newspapers were subsidized; Slav banks were started; everywhere the very existence of the Italian population was made unbearable. From Tolmino to Dalmatia the Slavic cry was: "Pri moru Taljanski!" (Into the sea with the Italians!) The only history books allowed in the schools were those carefully edited by Austrians to disparage Italy. In Trieste it was even forbidden to teach the history of the city, because this was too Italian.

In Dalmatia this denaturalization took the form of physical force; in 1833 there was an actual massacre of Italians by Croats at Spalato, and in 1897 the municipality of Cattaro was captured by wholesale fraud.

The communal census shows that in 1900, 77 per cent of the population of Dalmatia was Italian and 16 per cent Slav; that in 1910 the Italian population was 74 per cent and the Slav 20 per cent. The Government census shows that by 1910 the Italian population was only 62 per cent

and the Slav was 31 per cent. Whichever figures be correct, the Slavs polled 10,666 votes in the 1910 elections, against 6,438 in those of 1901.

JUGO-SLAV AGITATION IS ARTIFICIAL

It would need a book to tell fully the terrible story of the systematic denaturing of these Italian provinces, a story that is paralleled only by Prussia's treatment of Poland and by England's treatment of Ireland. The herosim with which this separated fragment of the Latin race, numbering only 450,000, has held fast to its ideals, and in the face of the united efforts of many millions of Slavs of every kind, officially and systematically organized by the Austrian Government is one of the magnificent martyrdoms of history. And this new-born propaganda for autonomy on the part of the Jugo-Slavs, of which so much has been heard in the last few months, especially in America, is only a further development of Austro-German hostility to their former ally.

That this is nothing but an artificial agitation is proved by the fact that the entire male Slav population of all the territories that are represented as pleading for autonomy—Serbia alone excepted—are fighting loyally in the armies of Austria-Hungary. They have never heard of this mushroom Jugo-Slav movement; they have never made any attempt to assert the "rights" that have suddenly been discovered for them. Jugo-Slavism is said to have been made in Germany, but in Rome they say it is really of German-American origin.

This denaturing of the Italian provinces, while not evidently in contravention of the Triple Alliance, is really a phase of Austrian aggression in the Balkans, against which Article VII, of the treaty, is specially directed. The Jugo-Slav propaganda is its ultimate development, the manifestation of its object—namely, the preservation of the Adriatic to the Teutonic powers, so that they may continue to launch their warships into an arm of the Mediterranean.

And Germany and Austria were for thirty-four years Italy's allies!

THE ASPIRATIONS OF ITALY AND THE RIGHTS OF CIVILIZATION*

BY HON. ARNALDO AGNELLI

Deputy in the Italian Parliament from Milan

MY DEAR FRIEND:

You have told me of your sympathy for the Italian cause and of how you defend us when, in your presence, imperialistic intentions and aspirations are attributed to Italy; but you also add that you have need of accurate data on the part which Italy is playing in the common war and on the hopes which she expects to realize.

This information would mature your sympathy, transforming it into profound and sure conviction, and more than all would complete your authentic information on the subject.

I am ready to give you satisfaction, and I will do it, forcing myself to that impartiality and serenity of judgment which is the first duty of one who speaks of his own country to a stranger and a political adversary. I will do it the more gladly because I have been able to establish the necessity of making some corrections in the opinions which are too often given currency in France as in England, in Switzerland or elsewhere, the origin of which must always be sought for in incomplete information.

This lack of information does not surprise me.

In the history of the last thirty years in Italy, our national aspirations have had a singular impulse and development.

Bound, as we were, by an alliance with Austria-Hungary, as with Germany, the official politics of Italy has

*A letter to an influential member of the Socialist Party in France, who requested enlightenment on the Italian question.

always, as one might say, had to put the soft pedal on the *irridentista* question. The government was always taking measures of increasing severity in this regard. Occasionally it even went so far as to prohibit simple patriotic demonstrations and theatrical performances which referred to historic events perfectly well known to all Italians.

Austria was always alert, and on the slightest pretext never failed to make official complaints and remonstrances.

Naturally, the profound sentiment of the people and the ideals of the best element of all the parties without distinction, looked eagerly into the future for the fulfillment of our national destiny. There was no lack of organizations to cultivate this sentiment, to keep it from dying out in the spirit of the people, above all to defend our language and our civilization beyond the political frontiers of Italy; but, officially, Italy never allowed herself to refer to the restitution of her territory.

We have had many characteristic proofs, both of the vitality of this sentiment in the face of every obstacle, and of the zeal of our government to intervene and prevent its manifestation.

Marcora, President of the Chamber of Deputies, pronouncing a public eulogy of an old Republican, the deputy Socci, who had died shortly before, alluded to the Trentino and called it in passing "our Trentino." Socci had fought in 1866 with Garibaldi, up to the very gates of Trent. The Italian government was obliged to apologize to Austria.

A general, Asinari di Bernezzo, saluting a flag which the women of Brescia had presented to a newly formed cavalry regiment, ventured to express his desire to see it crowned with the laurels of victory for the liberation of our brothers; a natural sentiment in a general himself a veteran of the wars for Italian independence. He was forced to resign his command. A former President of the Cabinet, Fortis, spoke rather openly before the Chamber of Deputies of Italy's legitimate anxiety over

the enormous armaments of Austria, and over the fact that preparations for an offensive against us were without doubt in progress, especially in the Trentino. Fortis found it very strange that we should be obliged, above all things, to protect ourselves from aggression on the part of our allies. This utterance was accorded an unparalleled demonstration of approval by all the members of Parliament. It was the triumph of truth. The next day Fortis, on the advice of the more prudent, was obliged to explain, to modify, to attenuate, to rectify, certain details of his too spontaneous, but none the less perfectly justified, outburst.

I could mention numerous instances, which, during the period of our alliance, would furnish absolute proof that the memory of our brothers, subject to the Austrian dominion, was still keenly alive in our hearts; but that at the same time the government deemed it necessary to conceal it if not to suppress it completely.

I am not surprised that these facts were entirely unknown to the world at large. A country is judged abroad synthetically and *en masse*. It is impossible to make known the hidden recesses of its mentality.

Compare, if you please, our condition with that of France after 1870-1871. Your beautiful language so well known over all the world, your literature, your novels and your dramas which everyone reads and admires, your books and your newspapers, the discourses of your orators, have spread so widely the knowledge of your sufferings and of your lively hope in a day of reckoning, that no educated person in Europe is unaware of the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

It was notorious, I hasten to add, that the different political parties offered different solutions of this great question. We are familiar with the speeches of Jaures and the book of Sembat, as well as with the activity of Deroulede and of Maurice Barres. I have nothing to say in this regard except to note that the difference in attitude corresponded to a different evolution of ideas;

but I am satisfied to observe that your problem had been placed before Europe. The same problem had been submitted to public opinion even for those countries which had no existence except in the hopes of their exiled and persecuted peoples, as in the case of Poland; while for us profound silence shrouded our hopes and aspirations. It was necessary to live a long time in Italy to realize how widespread and well rooted were these aspirations of which even the best informed among the foreigners were unaware. Still the hope was strong in us and it was founded upon incontestable right.

You undoubtedly know that Metternich said that Italy in his time did not exist politically, that it was only a "geographical expression." Without wishing to do so, Metternich uttered the most forceful argument in favor of our independence and unity. Indeed few nations in the world have a geographic character so precise and clearly determined and can claim frontiers so exactly delineated by nature.

For the national consciousness, when it was reawakened in the first half of the nineteenth century, the summit of the Alps and the sea afforded a boundary so exact, a natural confine so suggestive that Italy saw indicated there all her program. From this fact sprang a double consequence, positive and negative, on which I ask you to reflect a little.

Even if Italy did not think of expanding her present territory, even if she renounced all intention of extending to her natural boundaries, still her safety, her freedom of action, her independence, her very dignity will be in peril as long as a hostile power retains a foothold on this side of the mountain chain which separates her from the rest of Europe.

This is the reason why a feeling such as ours seemed to sleep or to be momentarily calmed, but in reality it could not be extinguished nor disappear without endangering our national existence itself.

But there was another, or even stronger reason which

held us back. A reason which I believe is analogous with the state of mind of many of our friends, good Socialists and good Frenchmen at the same time.

For, in this instance, without renouncing our hope in the just working out of our destiny, we placed above every consideration the supreme necessity of maintaining peace.

I will indicate the character of this policy in the very words of Jaures, who, in a certain sense, is the master of us all.

"This policy," said Jaures in 1909, "necessitates neither the repudiation of the right of conquest, nor the proclamation of that right; it implies faith in the triumph of justice which eventually will emerge from the development of democracy and from the certainty of a permanent peace."

We knew, or at least we felt confusedly, what a terrible catastrophe would be provoked by war. We had all pondered upon that marvellously prophetic page in which Jean Jaures spoke of how great would be the disaster (from every point of view) of a general conflagration.

In Italy, our formula, both for the radicals and for the reform socialists, was not to refuse any measure necessary for the national defense; but we could not conceive and would not have approved a policy of methodical preparation for war.

Maybe we were mistaken. But such was the fact and the necessary consequence was the avoidance of any aggressive policy. Many of us wished to reduce our armaments and turn our attention and financial efforts to economic and social reforms, to public education, and to increasing the productivity of our country which had just entered the industrial, commercial and agricultural movement of the great civilized nations. But we could not, without falling into flagrant contradiction, challenge Austria with our indisputable right to complete national unity, involving *irredentismo* and at the same time curtail our military program. It is absurd to desire the end without being willing to provide the means. This was our predicament at the beginning of the war.

As you know, our purely defensive alliance put us under no obligation to act with the Central Powers.

I will say only a word about this matter: Read the Austrian Red Book on the conflict with Italy. You will find that the consequences of the seventh article of the treaty of alliance are very subtly discussed but you will not find the least recrimination, the slightest reproof for our neutrality. Rather is the whole book dominated by the idea that our right to remain neutral was unquestionable. Not for one moment, during those months of endless discussion, did Austria dare hold us to obligations derived from a treaty which she had violated both in letter and in spirit.

The "compensations" which were offered us implied at the same time three logical consequences which are most important to record; first, our full and absolute right to remain neutral; second, the violation of the treaty of alliance both by Austria and Germany; third, the Italian nature, what we would call the *Italianità* of the territory they proposed to cede to Italy.

Free in our actions, we chose deliberately the path which we have held in conformity to our ideals of democracy. The whole movement from September, 1914 to May, 1915, the debates which established that our intervention was inevitable and caused a radical change in our foreign policy, were prompted only by sentiments of justice and human solidarity, by indignation against the Central Empires, by those very sentiments without which humanity would revert into a horde of savages.

You have only to read the newspapers of that period, tracing the course of events day by day, in the publications for propaganda, in the speeches in Parliament and especially those made at public gatherings. You have only to remember that two men, more than any others, labored to mould our consciousness, embodying in those confused months, the development of public opinion. They were two socialists: Battisti, deputy to the Reichstag in Vienna, who spoke in the name of the Trentino

and the other unredeemed provinces, and Destrée, deputy in the Belgian Parliament, who spoke in the name of his own country.

Today, after two years and a half of sharp and arduous warfare, after the intervention of America which has without doubt given a new aspect to the conflict, have we not the right to insist, even in the face of all Europe, have we not the duty to stand firm until the day when our brothers are liberated, exactly as do the French who never lose sight of the question of Alsace-Lorraine?

Italy was party to a system of alliance solely for the sake of maintaining peace. In 1913 she refused to become entangled in another *Bellum punitivum* premeditated by Austria and Germany against Serbia. Not being responsible for the conflict, had she not the right to expect results which would resolve the problems of nationality, guaranteeing peace for the future?

I believe that we have the right to resist, especially for our brothers who are still under the Austrian yoke, the most terrible of all foreign dominations.

In fact the Hapsburgs have never known any scruples in the methods which they use for dealing with the unhappy races which are in the minority in the Austrian Empire, the Czech-Slovenes and the Jugo-Slavs, in short all those who are not either Germans or Hungarians. The existence and the continuation of the Empire has no other foundation than systematic persecution and the racial hatreds which the ruling caste has known how to arouse, and has always kept alive, letting it loose sometimes with an incredible cynicism.

The Italians of these lands to be redeemed are worthy of the sacrifices which they are costing Italy. For, heed it well, a long history of struggle, of suffering, of martyrdom, had strengthened their desire and confirmed the necessity of their union with their mother country.

The Trentino, eastern Friuli, Istria and the other provinces and cities of the eastern coast of the Adriatic cherished the hope, during all the period of the Resorgi-

mento, of being united to the other Italian provinces. Many of their sons fought in the wars of independence. Driven by the revolutionary force of their principles and their energy, guided by men like Cavour and Garibaldi, Italy developed into a nation, her various regions were welded into unity around the center of Rome, the mother city. What was this movement if not the continuation and fulfilment of the impulse which the French Revolution gave to Europe?

No one then disputed the right of Trent and Trieste to become a member of the great Italian family, any more than that of Naples, of Milan, of Turin or Palermo. Even Austria, who dominated directly such an important part of Northern Italy, and had a strong indirect influence in the entire peninsula, had not yet thought seriously of undertaking a work of denationalization. After 1866 the scene changes. A large Italian population of nearly a million inhabitants is left on the margin on the Austrian Empire. Austria, who in the treaty of peace had succeeded in holding a part of the Italian territory, hopes to use the Trentino as an easy ingress and a constant menace to Italy. By means of the eastern Friul, Trieste and the coast, she wishes to insure for herself mastery of the sea and of the hinterland, and dominion over the Balkans. With this in view she promotes Pan-Germanism in the Trentino and encourages the Slavic population in every way to move to Istria in general and to Trieste in particular. In this scheme we may find the reason for the abolition of any form of autonomous government for the Trentino, notwithstanding the desire of all parties to weld it with the German Tyrol. In this scheme we may find the reason for the traditional policy of Austria, which obstinately refused to establish an Italian University and limited or abolished other Italian schools. After the annexation of Venice to Italy the diplomas issued by the University of Padua, which had been frequented for centuries by the youth of the Trentino and Trieste, lost all legal value in Austria. The right of the Italians to a

higher education in their own tongue was incontestable. To oblige them to study in the German language at Vienna or Gratz was an injustice. This right was conceded theoretically but denied in fact. After exerting every sort of pressure, after enormous loss of time covering many years (only the Turkish Empire, her worthy ally of today, can compete with Austria for systematic and deliberate slowness of legal procedure) a law course was instituted in the ultra-German city of Insbruck, and even that course was not a complete one.

The lectures began on November 3, 1904; on November 4, they were suspended on account of disturbances caused by the populace who persecuted the one hundred and fifty Italian students. The populace was allowed to enter and destroy the Italian law school.

After this admirable example of *kultur* the lectures were not resumed. The Italian University was still spoken of and all possible solutions were discussed, but its institution at Trieste, its natural seat, unanimously demanded by all Italians, was never permitted; and there was never the least indication of putting into effect the project which was in fact only a ruse. The real purpose of the government was to prevent the formation and consolidation of a national consciousness among the Italians.

There was not a single governmental high school in Trieste; the only one existing was maintained by the municipality. Instead there were many German and Slav schools in purely Italian districts and everywhere there were officials who did not understand either the language nor the needs of the Italians.

Unheard-of restrictions as to liberty of education, of meeting, of association, of thought, of discussion, were aimed against the Italians as such, while the antagonistic races were favored in every way.

Our countrymen waged their national war on the ground of legality. Do you remember what Jaures wrote about the similar struggle which was going on in

Alsace-Lorraine? The analogy is very striking. Friend of peace as he was, he nevertheless admired the task to which your *irredenti* had dedicated themselves. "No longer awaiting," he said, "the resumption of justice by reason of the fortunes of war, Alsace has told herself that her duty and her safety consisted *at least in the present territorial disposition of Europe*, in preserving the originality of her ideas, perpetuating under the yoke of the conqueror that fragment of the soul of France which she held in trust." And it is in this manner that among all classes of the people of Alsace the French culture and the French language have never been so universal as they are today. Thus, in the present moment in Alsace, all the parties are grouped together, without one conceding anything to the advantage of another, each clinging to its own ideals: Catholics, Socialists, Democrats, Anti-Clericals, they are all united in demanding from Germany a broader administrative autonomy, to protest against the brutality of Prussian bureaucracy, to insist on the right of the people of Alsace-Lorraine to continue their French culture.

Austria did not, in fact, have the excuse of an exceptional regime for the Italian provinces. The whole governmental system in these provinces is in opposition to the written guarantees of the Austrian constitution, and of the fundamental laws defining the general rights of citizens (December 21, 1867), as established by article 19: "All the nationalities of the state have equal rights and every nationality taken separately has the right to preserve and cultivate its national life and language. Equality before the law for all languages of the country, in schools, in public office, in public life, is recognized by the state. In those provinces inhabited by people of differing nationality the public schools shall be so conducted that each nationality will find the necessary means to acquire an education in its own tongue without being obliged to learn another language of the country."

I wanted particularly to quote literally this paragraph

to demonstrate the real value which new obligations would have in Austria: They would be violated as usual.

* * * * *

Speaking to a foreigner and a Socialist I will take a strictly international point of view.

In London, February 7, 1915, before Italy entered the war, the Socialists of the Entente proclaimed their principle: "In all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, peoples annexed by force must recover the right to dispose of themselves."

It is an elementary principle of any internationalism that there is no real and sincere social progress without absolute equality of conditions among the people, without respect to race. On the other hand, why not say it? It would seem in certain moments that preoccupation with social questions might cause the question of nationality to be forgotten. It may be true, for example, for the English Socialists and for those of the Socialists in France, Russia and Italy who do not live in constant touch with the centers where, under the heel of foreign oppression, the struggle for nationality still surges implacably. But for countries which are not in possession of their independence, where racial animosities are still alive, where an astute government aggravates it to the limit of its power, the two battles become merged, and any social progress is paralyzed; any serious victory is rendered impossible for lack of the conditions essential to such progress and such victory.

Ask the Czech Socialists, the Socialists of Alsace-Lorraine, ask the Socialists of Belgium where perfidious Germany strives to nourish the hatred of the Fleming for the Walloon. And if there be any who can be called Socialists at Trieste (not at Trent nor in the other Italian provinces), who dare affirm the contrary—who are among the most faithful adherents of Scheidemann and his policy, they represent the most absurd and monstrous contradiction. They surely deserve to be, as they indeed were in other times, friends of Prince Hohenlohe,

governor of the Italian city of Trent in the name of the Hapsburgs. They deserve to be today, as they were in truth in their local newspapers, mouthpieces of the Austrian General Staff.

We can even go so far as to understand that in times of peace those Socialists take no part in the struggle for nationality, even declare their indifference to it. A grave error from our point of view, but capable of explanation if one admits that they are so absorbed by the labor of completing the organization of the proletariat that they do not wish to divert from it the least force. But today when we have a glimpse of the possibility of preparing the confederation of nations, when we hope to bring forth from all our misfortunes and all our agony a logical and organized international life, founded on justice and peace, today—when those who call themselves Socialists follow the lead of a tradition-bound, reactionary, militaristic and clerical state—that is the thing we cannot understand without attributing it to a fearful blindness. The empire of the Hapsburgs, of which these Socialists would be the support, is absolutely incapable of internal reformation. It enjoys a residue of cohesion which is secured to it by the brutality of its methods of government, by its blindly, summary military and civil discipline, inexorable in its acts of repression, and by the division and complete opposition of the elements which compose it, which ought to work together for the common good and yet which cannot even attempt it without danger of a revolution.

The spectacle which the Reichsrat furnishes is a proof of this; the fact that the Emperor of Austria, after reigning for several months, has not dared to swear to support the constitution is another.

Now, that some Socialists should wish to reinforce, to continue, to perpetuate all this, let me repeat it, is absurd and monstrous.

One name should suffice to silence them, that of Cesare Battisti, the Socialist deputy from Trent; that pure, in-

corruptible and generous man who paid with his life-blood for his devotion to his country, for love of which he never forgot nor deserted the cause of Socialism.

While others did not blush to climb the ladder to favor in the service of the Government which oppressed their brothers, Cesare Battisti, at the Reichsrat of Vienna and at the provincial Diet of Innsbruck, pronounced fiery denunciations of Austrian militarism. He did his whole duty as a Socialist but he declared most emphatically that "any opposition to the reconstruction of national unities was an opposition to Socialism itself, because the existence of the national groups was the logical and necessary antecedent of the development of civilization and therefore of Socialism." (Battisti, *Il Trentino*, page 15.)

After having fought with tongue and with pen, he came to Italy in August, 1914, so as not to serve in the Austrian army in its aggression on Serbia. He volunteered in the Italian army at the beginning of the war. As an officer of the Alpini, he fought like a hero, wounded in action, he was captured, sentenced to die, and mounted the scaffold crying in the face of his executioners, "Long live Italy."

Nor was he the only one. An Istrian, a man of the people, Nazario Sauro, was executed by Austria; others like Filzi and Rismondo suffered the same fate, as did the first of all these patriots, Guglielmo Oberdan, who was put to death by Austria in 1882.

And these are only a few of the bloodiest incidents in a long persecution of which I could cite numerous instances. Associations were methodically broken up, newspapers suppressed, prosecutions begun without foundation; on every pretext and even without pretext, Austria punished with prison, misery, and exile, those who were and who declared themselves Italians. Let us ask ourselves again: Is the progress of civilization possible; can the social struggle be carried on fairly and freely, when the actions of the government are inspired by such tendencies?

This, the true and unhappy condition of the Italian

provinces which are under Austrian domination, is proven by all the proclamations which these peoples have addressed to Italy, and even to the president of the French Republic in 1910, on the occasion of his visit to Rome. This is the reason why in the present circumstances we should not think of resolving this problem by consulting the people in a referendum or a plebiscite.

The practical and technical impossibility of this procedure has been demonstrated by the address to Citizen Branting on the part of the Socialists of Alsace-Lorraine. But we have even stronger reasons for opposing the referendum.

All Italians subject to Austria, who have succeeded in escaping either to Russia or to Italy, are deprived of all means of communication with their fellow citizens: 50,000 are in Italy; many thousands enlisted in the Italian army are fighting at the front; they are fighting for Italy, or rather for a new and better Europe; hundreds and hundreds of them have already lost their lives.

In Austria, more than 50,000 Italians from the unredeemed provinces, the flower of the Italian population (one need only examine the list to convince himself), have been interned. The number of dead, invalids and infirm is appalling. Over 1,000 citizens are imprisoned in the fortresses; all the rest of the men who can possibly bear arms have been mustered into the Austrian army, which is itself only a vast concentration camp and a huge fortress in which the officer abuses the soldier in whom has never burned the spark of a common national ideal. The population consists of women, children and aged persons; terror pervades everywhere; how could these people be consulted? Into what trap would we lead them? Bear in mind that the Austro-Hungarian premier, in open Reichsrat, had declared that all these measures of oppression and repression are necessary, indispensable, inevitable. Without these, he declares, Austrian national life would be unsafe. What other country treats its citizens in such a manner? Is this not a terrible confession? Does not this amount to a plebiscite?

And note that what is being done to the Italians, is also perpetrated for the same reasons against the Jugo-Slavs and the Czechs.

Permit me to make a final observation. You are perhaps saying that since there is a racial rivalry in certain places between the Italians and the Slavs, the Italian subjects of Austria, seeking to unite with Italy, think only of themselves and that guarantees are necessary for the representatives of the other young and growing races, who have themselves no less a right to live, to prosper and to progress in perfect liberty.

All this is entirely just in principle and deserves an exact explanation.

We ask, first of all, the annexation to Italy of cities and regions where the population is solidly Italian; where the Slavic and German element is as small in proportion as is the foreign element in certain cities of the interior, such as Florence and Rome, centers of Italian sentiment since Italy first was; we will not correct the exaggerated, altered, falsified census taken by Austria. But where it is a question of towns with mixed population, it is just to recognize and insure every right, the school above all else, to any nationality living on Italian soil.

Is Italy, or is she not, better qualified than Austria to give these assurances and these legitimate guarantees?

There is a triumphant response to be given. It is founded on experience. Even the worst calumniators of Italy have not been able to cite a single fact to prove any act of oppression or persecution against the French, Albanian, German and Slavic peoples who live on this side of the Alps in Italian territory.

Some of these, like the Albanian population in the south and in Sicily, have lived in Italy from time immemorial. The French of the Val d'Aosta, the Germans of the Veneto, the 30,000 Slovenes on the banks of the Natisone near Cividale have never had occasion to complain of the treatment they have received in Italy. Their ethnographic individuality is fully respected, and this fact is easily explained. Italy owes her existence to principles

of liberty just as Austria owes hers to principles of autocracy; all the guarantees, all the greatest precautions are taken on this account.

Therefore if it is a question of choosing between Italy and Austria, our enemies have shown us the measure of their tyranny and their scorn for every civil right, for in the course of their long history they have always been the very center of reaction in Europe.

If, on the other hand, the goal of the independence and unification of all people is reached, Europe has without doubt the right to demand that an adjustment be made among those interested, on both sides, which is compatible with the free development of all nationalities. It will only remain to have it put into execution by the most scrupulously just men. To disturb this possibility of harmony, which you well know is about to be realized, would be to play into the hands of our common enemy.

In the great public square of Trent, the veneration of the Italians of all parts of our country has caused to be erected a monument to Dante. It stands there, a symbol of our unity, a memorial of our greatness, an inspiration to our duty for today and for the future.

I can make no better summary of my thoughts than to quote the words which are carved on that pedestal. The words of the inscription were uttered by Giovanni Bovio, the republican in whom a tempestuous political life had not disturbed the calm of his philosophic vision. It is reported that our enemies have defaced and insulted this monument. If this is true (I still hope that it is not) it must be concluded that they were unworthy to read these words—much less to understand them.

The inscription says: "To Dante, the Father, with the homage of the whole nation, bow ye strangers, let us bow, Italians, and let us rise again brothers once more in justice."

Is that day still far off? I do not know, but I know this, that the ideal which Italy, cradle of our civilization, is striving to realize at the price of her most precious blood springs from this noble motive which honors whatever nation cherishes it.

ARNALDO AGNELLI.

ITALY'S EFFORT*

BY PAUL DESCHANEL

President of the French Chamber of Deputies

When, in May 1915, Italy took her place besides the Allies she fully recognized the difficulty of her task. She knew that the war would be long and arduous, that it would cost enormously in men and money, that it would cause an upheaval of her economic life.

The rupture of the Triple Alliance obliged Italy to seek other markets for her commerce than those offered in the Central Empires. But Italy knew also that she could not remain neutral at the moment when a new Europe was to be born. In that conviction she was faithful to the tradition of the great patriots to whom she owes her unity. Mazzini said: "I love my country because I love the idea of country, I love Liberty because I believe in Liberty, and I want our rights because I believe in Right." For two years Italy has made a strong fight. Her keen diplomacy has little by little broken the bonds with which the Germans sought to restrict it. The rupture with Germany delivered Italy from a real servitude. The proud nation of Manin, Victor Emmanuel, Cavour and Garibaldi has earned her independence. Free she now labours for the common cause. On the desolate plateau of the Carso, at the summit of the Trentino Alps, her armies have won, in spite of the enormous difficulties which the nature of the ground offered. As in France, all classes have participated in the struggle and even the King, who has been in the midst of the campaign since the beginning, prides himself on being like his grandfather, "the first soldier of the Italian independence." Italians of the north and of the south, Lombards, Nea-

*An article which appeared in *La Renaissance*, May 26, 1917.

politans, Calabrians, Sicilians, Tuscans, Venetians, Romans and Emilians, have responded with the same courage to the call of the fatherland. Young men and old have bound together their strength and their hopes.

Behind the lines, life is transformed. Everywhere there are manufacturing plants and work shops—I have just seen those in Genoa—a world working for the defense of the nation. Everywhere the land is cultivated, and where men are lacking, children and women replace them. But in spite of these efforts, life is not easy. The people have submitted cheerfully to many restrictions. To cover the expense of the struggle new taxes have been levied and the people have subscribed largely to the public loans. The immense resources thus accumulated make it possible to keep pace with the heavy burden of war. What Salandra in 1915 required of the nation is now a fact: "All strength is united into one effort, all hearts into one heart." The women of Italy, like those of France, have shown themselves worthy of the utmost respect. For two years they have alleviated suffering, consoled the grief-stricken and encouraged the weak. Great in their charity, they have been great also in their misfortunes. Innumerable bereavements have found them resigned and ready for sacrifice.

Thus all will have a share in the victory for which all have labored. The "Terza Italia" will open a new era of prosperity—an era which Carducci, the poet of the epics of 1859, Palestro, Magenta, San Martino, the exploits of Garibaldi (renewed by his grandsons in the Argonne today), the "one thousand," the proclamation of the capital of Rome, the prophet of greater Italy and the achievements of Cadorna's soldiers—all have prepared for Italy.

During a glorious peace, glorious not only in the realm of literature, art and science, but also in agriculture, industry and commerce, Italy will pursue her way along the path bright with immortal beauty.

ITALY'S CLAIM TO ISTRIA*

BY PROF. CHARLES UPSON CLARK

Of the American Academy in Rome

To the Editor of the New York Times:

On his deathbed in June, 1861, Camillo Cavour summed up his life work. He had guided the little Piedmontese kingdom in that marvelous career which had changed Italy from Metternich's contemptuous "geographical expression" to a realm powerful enough to be courted by Bismarck. The Quirinal was still the palace of the Pope; Venice was still Austrian; but Cavour foresaw their speedy union with the House of Savoy. "As for Istria and the Tyrol," said he, "that is another matter. That will be the task of another generation."

And yet, only five years later, Italian armies nearly realized the ambition so well put by Mazzini: "Italy's eastern frontier has been drawn ever since Dante wrote

A Pola, presso del Quarnaro
Che Italia chiude e i suoi termini bagna (Inferno ix, 113.)

(At Pola, near the Quarnaro, which encloses Italy, and laves her boundaries.)

On July 22, 1866, General Cialdini wrote General Cadorna (father of the former Italian Commander-in-Chief, who is thus Cavour's "other generation"): "If the enemy has abandoned Gorizia, as I assume, and is now two or three days' march away, you will have one division occupy Gorizia. . . With the other two you will proceed to occupy Trieste. . . But if the enemy's troops have held firm at Gorizia you will go and attack them with all three divisions, and, after beating them as vigorously as you can, have one division follow them up, and with the other two

*A letter published in the *New York Times*, December 23, 1917.

push on toward Trieste." And even after the failure of this plan the kingdom of Italy nearly secured its end by diplomacy. General Govone, Victor Emmanuel's plenipotentiary in Prussia, was able to write the Italian Foreign Minister from Nikolsburg on July 28 that, having asked Bismarck if in the word "Venetia" he included the Trentino and Istria, "he answered 'yes,' and authorized me, on my requesting him, to make that official statement to your Excellency." Then Italy would have realized the sober judgment of Napoleon when he sanctioned the statement of Prince Eugene Beauharnais—"Eugene is the only one of us who never makes mistakes," Napoleon used to say, and with good reason—that the only scientific and satisfactory boundary of Italy is that "traced by nature herself along the mountain summits which divide the watersheds of the Black Sea and the Adriatic." That line, added Napoleon, "would pass between Laibach and the Isonzo; would include part of Carniola and Istria, and would join the Adriatic at Fiume."

But, alas, in 1866, victorious Prussia decided not to overhumiliate Austria—that Austria which Mazzini had so justly likened to Turkey; one who wishes to break up the Turkish Empire, said he, and maintain the Austrian, is supporting a contradiction; the two anomalies will stand or fall together. Bismarck was not ready for that step; he had further use for Austria; and the Italian Army and Navy in 1866 were not in themselves strong enough to round out Italian unity. In vain did Ricasoli, head of the Cabinet, point out that so long as Austria continued to hold a foot of Italian soil there would never be a lasting peace. Bismarck himself recognized the blunder in his memorandum of April, 1868. ("Germany and Italy Natural Allies.") "By the end of the current year," he wrote, "Germany should form one single powerful State, extending from the Baltic to the Alps, from the Rhine to the Vistula and the Drave. Italy ought no longer to have choice provinces in foreigners' possession. . . . The empire of the Mediterranean belongs incontestably to Italy."

She possesses in that sea coasts which are a dozen times longer than those of France. Marseilles and Toulon cannot be brought into comparison with Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Palermo, Ancona, Venice, and Trieste."

Bismarck, then, and Napoleon saw as clearly as Cavour and Mazzini that the manifest destiny of Italy was to reunite with herself that Istrian province which the fatal Treaty of Campoformio had torn in 1797 from her Venetian allegiance of centuries, and handed over to the tender mercies of Austria. Istria was again Italian under Napoleon, from 1806 to 1814; and all the tireless activity of Vienna, her attempts to make Italians speak German by refusing them any higher schools with Italian-speaking instructors; her brutal policy of filling Istria with Slovenian and Croatian peasants, and with public officials of other Slav nationalities; her persecution of every public man or every town council that ventured to stress Italian sympathies even in literature or art—a process of the same nature and longer duration than that of Prussia in Alsace-Lorraine—all this had had so little success that Garibaldi could write in 1867: "I am a true friend of Istria; and the warmest of my desires is that I may be able to serve the cause of that Italian country;" and in 1878, to Bizzoni of Genoa: "Let us prepare Italy for the war to the death against Austria, in which our stake is 'to be or not to be' for other centuries;" and to Trieste: "If to-day I regret that I am an old man, it is that I am of little use to the sacred cause of Trieste and Trent; at any rate I shall be proud to give it the last days of my life."

Nor was Dante the only Italian poet to remark that Istria is part of Italy. Carducci, in his famous tributes of December, 1882, to Guglielmo Oberdan, who had just been hanged at Trieste, issued the appeal which consecrated the effort of the next generation: "On the north-east, from the Central and Eastern Alps, the Austro-Hungarian Empire has us by the throat; on the northwest, from the Western Alps, the French Republic threatens us at our shoulders. On our coasts we are at every one's

mercy. . . . Now we need social reforms, for justice; economic reforms, for strength; arms, arms, arms, for security. And arms, not for defense, but for offense. Italy can only protect herself by attacking; otherwise she will be invaded. . . . Let us raise, within ten years, on the furthest crest of these Alps of ours, a monument to Gaius Marius and to Giuseppe Garibaldi, with the motto: 'Foreigners, back!'"

And Italy's greatest modern poet, Gabriele d'Annunzio, is carrying into execution these precepts of Carducci's, not only by the enthusiasm created by his patriotic verse but by those airplane flights over Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro, of which he has given us such rhapsodic descriptions.

I have quoted enough to show how Istria was regarded by the makers of modern Italy. Why is this? What is there in that rocky promontory, only about 50 miles long by 40 across, that calls forth such single-hearted devotion? Why is it that statesmen who hesitated about other Adriatic problems were always convinced of Italy's rights to Istria?

I suppose the first impelling cause is historical. Istria was as thoroughly Roman a province as Venetia; she fought the barbarians of past ages as bravely; she clung to the Roman government of Ravenna until her own free communes arose, as on the mainland opposite; and in the thirteenth century she came under the protection of Venice, whose soft dialect is still the speech of all her seaport towns and inland cities. Not till Napoleon's ambition led him to use Venice as a pawn with Austria was Istria severed from Italy; and even then, as we have seen, she was reunited with Italy from 1806 to 1814. Austria, then, has had just a century in which to win Istrian allegiance; and she has made use of every device known to the Teuton. By wholesale importation she has made the countryside Slav; but Italians still pay five-sixths of the rent tax, three-quarters of the industrial tax, four-fifths of the income tax. She gives subventions to some fifty-five Croatian

schools—those of Sts. Cyril and Methodius—but that it is purely missionary work is shown by the fact that Istrians contribute only about 10 per cent of the receipts; the rest is supplied by the Government and private and clerical contributions from Croatia. Austria has filled Istria with German and Slav civil, military, and naval employes; in Pola, for instance, in the 1912 elections, only 1 per cent of the navy vote was for the Italian candidate. Italians, then, are as justified in feeling sympathy for their Istrian brethren as do the French for the Alsatians. It may be said that the incorporation of a partly Slav population in Italy would be unjust, and that a plebiscite would be the only just solution. Happily, Italy can show many a valley where she rules over people of non-Italian tongue, who are as devoted as the Tuscans or the Venetians. The Waldensians speak Provencal; the upper Val d'Aosta, French; at Macugnaga one hears the German of South Switzerland; Albanian, Greek, and Catalan are spoken in various parts of Italy; and in Friuli are even several thousand Slavs who have been contented Italians since 1866. The great Latin democracy may be trusted never to apply the methods of her feudal, aristocratic opponent.

Historically, then, Istria is a segment of unredeemed Italy. Geographically, she is as truly Italian. Italy is bounded by the Alps and the three seas; and the Julian Alps swing across the base of Istria, divide it off from the Slav hinterland, and give it, by their protection, a Mediterranean climate, with the olive groves and the vineyards so characteristic of Italy. In fact, as I traveled through Istria, I was struck by its resemblance to Greece and Spain (especially Estremadura) as well as to Italy; but there is nothing Central European about it.

But Italy has a further reason for demanding the retrocession of her lost province. Istria in foreign possession is a knife poised over her breast. The Adriatic has low-lying sandy shores to the west, without a single first-class harbor. Istria alone has half a dozen excellent ports; and Austria has made of Pola one of the world's great naval bases.

Austria's possession of the eastern Adriatic coast has closed that sea to Italy during the war; and if we are not to sow the seed of future wars in our peace negotiation the Austrian naval hierarchy must be banished; with a new South Slav State—a greater Serbo-Croatia—the case would be different, and a fair division of Dalmatia would secure it the necessary outlets on the sea, even with Istria wholly Italian.

Venice built her palaces of Istrian stone and her galleys of Istrian timber; Carpaccio and Schiavone were painters as Italian as their contemporaries of the peninsula. It is a noble series of Italian names from Istria that is crowned by that of Nazario Sauro of Capodistria, the devoted mariner who gave to Italy his knowledge of Istrian coasts and harbors when the war broke out, and on whom Austria has wreaked vengeance, as she has on Cesare Battisti, the former Deputy from Trent. From Alboin the Lombard down, the Teuton has never failed to add some tragic compelling touch to his maladroit efforts at controlling Latin peoples; the scaffolds of Battisti and of Sauro are a reminder to Italy and to the world of what is in store if Austria remains on Italian soil.

CHARLES UPSON CLARK.

New York, December 21, 1917.

PUTTING ALBANIA BACK ON THE MAP*

BY AMY A. BERNARDY

There runs wild about the press just now such an amount of incompetent talk and criticism about Albania and the present Italian protectorate of it, that a few facts will not come amiss for the clearer understanding of the situation. To begin with, should the reader not be quite familiar with the intricacies of Balkanic and Adriatic geography, let him refer to a good map and locate precisely the positions of which the names will recur here and there in these columns. Then he must imagine a rugged, picturesque, mountainous country looking down from the heights of the Akrokeraunian Mountains spoken of by Horace and Byron, upon the Adriatic, or rather Ionian Sea, and across it to the opposite shores of Italian Puglia, rising terraced and clear out of the shining waters.

From the wide gulf of Valona, protected by the cliffs of the mountains and guarded by the island of Saxseno, the road winds through the alluvial plains along the course of the more important Albanian waters and mountain passes; following in the traces of the ancient civilizations, it leads on one side to Epirus and Macedonia, on the other to the ancient Pelagonia, Sardica and Thessalonica, *i. e.*, to the present Monastir, Sofia and Salonica. This was in fact the road through which the Roman armies penetrated into the heart of the Balkans. Nor are these fragments of the Via Egnatia the only survival of history on Albanian ground, but several Venetian castles and ruins crown the hills at Santi Quaranta, Argiro-castro, and, not to speak of various others, Tepeleni, which boasts also an interesting single-arched Roman

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bridge. Mosques and Mohammedan religious monuments are frequent, since two-thirds of the Albanians are good Mohammedans, though they hate the Turk and his political and military domination worse, perhaps, than any other of the several foreign lordships to which they have been subjected or with which they have been threatened in the course of centuries, and at least as well as they hate the Greek. With Venice they got along capitally, since Venice knew enough of history and politics in a general way not to force nationalities, not to abuse and oppress the land financially, and to give them on the other hand all the benefit of her finished and perfected civilization. To this day the olive-groves of Valona testify to the civilizing influences of Venice, for it was the republic that had them planted and paid a silver coin as a price for every plant reaching a certain height and size. Rightfully enough, then, is the Lion of St. Mark to this day a symbol dear to the memory of the Albanians.

THE MANY ALBANIAN TRIBES

The Albanian language, primordial, perhaps pelasgic, in its formation, has no written literature, but in its place boasts what we might call a noble rhapsodic tradition, songs, legends, historical and epic narrations, familiar to the people, handed down through centuries and generations along with the wonderful silver, turquoise and coral jewelry, with the brilliant colors and embroideries of the women's attire, with the extremely picturesque accoutrement of the men. Thus as a well-defined unit in tradition, language and nationality have the Albanians reached the threshold of modernity through endless strife and struggle—the fate of the borderlands—and never achieved a well-defined political position of their own because of one shortcoming and imperfection in their national unit—internal discord and rivalry. The Albanian as a nationality is one, but the tribes are several; intervengeance

dating from past generations a law; and such discipline under the stress of the superior national ideal as could bring them together in self-government a myth. With all their magnificent primitive forces and uncurbed atavistic traditions raging among them, the Albanians are today, self admittedly, immature for self-government, and apt to fall prey of the most unscrupulous of their various neighbors, therefore, of the least desirable, not only to them, but to the whole of civilized Europe, that is, as matters stand today, to the whole of the Allies.

PLANTING KULTUR IN ALBANIA

It is regrettable that space prevents us here from tracing even rapidly the interesting developments of the Albanian idea from the time of their great leader and national hero, Scanderbeg, down to the end of the nineteenth century. But we must recall at least, from more recent political events, the "Statement of the League of Prizrend" to the Berlin convention of 1878, which was written at Scutari and submitted to the British representative, Lord Beaconsfield; and the important discussions of the "Convention of Monastir" held by the Albanians during the Turkish revolution to uphold their rights and state their wishes once more in the face of the crumbling Ottoman domination. This led up to the proclamation of Albanian independence, the twenty-eighth day of November, 1912, on the part of a number of delegates of the various Albanian tribes, and the consequent constitution of a provisional government, with Ismail Kemal Bey for its chief. This proclamation disgusted Greece, who had her own views on at least a part of Albania, and proceeded to answer it by bombarding Valona on December third of that same year. The implied menace hastened European diplomatic action on the subject, and on December 17 the neutralization of the autonomous principality of Albania under the protectorate of the great powers became a fact; the begin-

ning, it was hoped, of a new history. Unfortunately, instead, the Kultur succeeded in planting a German princeling, Wied, into the new-born principality, and disaster was inevitable, even if the great war had not broken out in 1914. As it was, Wied ran, and Italy was good enough to let him out on one of her ships; but it is not probable that "Wied," or king "Tino," by the way, who was allowed a similar privilege, feel adequately grateful. It may be added, incidentally, that, if these two weren't worth saving, the Italian navy took across the Adriatic some hundred thousand who were; namely, the defeated and heroic remains of the Servian army, with the old king and General Putnik, thus doing for Servia what France and England did for Belgium. But this is another story.

ALBANIA'S TRAGIC PROBLEMS

Then came a very sad time for Albania, with the terrors of war and of advancing hostile armies, with Austrian menace and Greek intrigue clashing with each other, but both bent on circumventing the allied influence and inevitable advance. Famine and epidemics were all over the land, and the danger of disease spreading across the Adriatic and over western Europe was not the least among the problems that confronted the Allies.

Meanwhile, moral problems equally tragic and severe had been confronting Albania all along. One of the most interesting and pathetic things that have been happening for years in Albania is that every foreign Power could go there and open a school and teach in it anything from Manchoo to Siamese, so to speak, but not Albanian. Austria and Greece were most anxious to invade the land respectively from north and south, and finally swallow the two halves up. With Greece the thing was comparatively easy. Most southern Albanians speak Greek fluently (polyglotism is a necessity in the congested Balkans and all around them), and besides about one-third of the Albanians belong to the Greek

Church; so the Greek linguistic invasion ran smoothly enough. Not so with Austria; the German language, even softened by Austrian accents, didn't make such easy learning for the people. Then did Austria hit upon a clever scheme. She remembered the Venetian ruins all over the hills, the welcome shade of the Venetian olive groves around Valona, the traditions of the Lion of St. Mark; and just as on the Adriatic she had appropriated the Venetian symbol and authority for the trade of her "Lloyd Austriaco" steamers, and the Venetian mariners for her fleet, just so did she take advantage of the familiarity of most of the Albanians, especially of the coast, with the Italian language, and proceeded to teach Italian in Austrian schools for the Albanian children. Whereupon one could hear them sing, innocently enough, poor little things, in Italian: "Serbi Dio l'Austriaco." (May God keep the Austrian Kingdom), and "Viva il nostro Imperator!" (long live our emperor) which was rather striking, when one remembered that Italians in Dalmatia were suffering gaol and death for wanting to speak in their schools the language that Austria put herself out to teach to foreign children in foreign soil—for her own purposes.

GREEK WIT OUTWITTED

And, since we relate anecdotes, let's have one about the Greeks too; anecdote is often the soul of history. When the international commission was trying to define the boundaries of Albania, Greece had resorted to all Ulysses' wiles to impress the Commissioners with the Hellenism of the disputed soil; even children were trained and used for the purpose. At Erseka one child, upon being questioned, duly answered in Greek that he was Greek and they all spoke Greek and even the family cat was Greek, or words to the same effect. The honest Britisher in the commission was ready to believe truth out of the mouth of a babe, indeed almost a suckling, and the rest were about to agree, when the Italian who

knew the country, and knew that it was Albanian soil and not Greek, sharply ordered the Albanian cavas to lightly cuff the child's ears; and out of the child's primitive instincts thus aroused came the unmistakable cry: "Nene!" (mother!) in Albanian. Thus was, for once, Greek wit outwitted by a descendant of Æneas, and Erseka was assigned to that part of Albania that also contains Santi Quaranta, Delvino, Argirocastro, Leskoviki, and so on; that is, the territory presently occupied by Italy, and from which (actually from Argirocastro) Italy has but recently issued her proclamation of united and independent Albania and of the Italian protectorate thereupon. And now comes the interesting question: What has Italy done with or to Albania?

ALBANIA MUST BE PROTECTED

Italy stands by the London Conference of 1913, and consequently desires Albania to be an independent unit and desires also to prevent her being dismembered by her various neighbors or swallowed up as a whole by the Austro-Germanic coalition. It is moreover self-evident that Italy and the Allies under the present war conditions cannot afford to leave Albania alone, which would simply mean allowing Austria to settle in a land manifestly incapable of self-defence at the present time and not strong enough to bar the gates of the Adriatic at Valona, to the enemies of the Allies. Military occupation of certain territories, principally the naval base of Valona, and political protectorate have therefore been resorted to as a measure of safety in the vital interest not only of Italy but of all the Allies; and it is equally evident to anyone in the least familiar with the political game and not completely blind to ordinary human psychology, that whoever starts and keeps up confusing talk upon alleged discord of the Allies in this line has an interest in the continuance of misinformation and mystification and furthers the interests of the enemy through the perplexity of the public mind. It is the common desire of the

Allies that Albania shall extend along the coast as far as Cape Stylos, thus preventing Greece from holding to the disadvantage of Valona both sides of the Corfu Canal. And although this is not the ideal realization of all the Albanians' national aspirations (which include the former Turkish vilayets of Scutari, Ianina, Kossovo and Monastir), still it comes within satisfactory range of them, and allows hopes for improvement, or, as diplomatic Europe calls it, rectification of the situation. With the occupation of Valona, Italy has practically barred the Adriatic and guaranteed the safety of her unprotected coast; more and better, she has prevented Austria from settling there, and one may easily imagine what the fate of the Allies in the Mediterranean would have been with the Austrians at Valona. About as bad, or rather worse, than it might have been with the Germans at Salonika.

ITALY'S RECONSTRUCTION WORK

Now Valona and Southern Albania may with pardonable pride on the part of Italy be pointed out as an example of what "civilized warfare" can do for a land; in other words, how a region can be organized and disciplined under military régime, without Prussianism. When the first detachment of Italian soldiers and sailors landed at Valona there was literally nothing doing in the line of modern equipment or sanitation; in fact, epidemics were raging through the country, with what danger of diffusion the Italian sanitary departments know, who were kept busy safeguarding Europe from the invasion of horrors greater than those of war itself. And there were thousands of huddled refugees, destitute and famished, all over. Italy went to work, and built four landing stages for the unloading of ships on the bare sand. And the ships began to unload things. The harbor of Valona is surrounded by mountainous cliffs and by marshy bog land; and the town is somewhat distant from the shore. Roads had to be hewn out of the rock or knocked out of the mud, and this was done by the Italian soldiers, who

found again in service of Italy and civilization those Roman capacities for road-building, bridge-throwing, tunnelling and so forth, of which America has had so many examples in the work of the Italian immigrant. Southern Albania possesses now four hundred and fifty kilometres of wide, solid, permanent roads, besides seventy kilometres of Decauville railroads. These railroads and bridges had to be built out of nothing, as nothing was there, apparently. Quarries were hammered out of the mountain-flanks and furnaces built for bricks and mortar as the land had nothing available. As for the city itself, it has been provided with new streets, a complete system of modern drainage and sewerage, gardens and trees. In the country around every military post is an agricultural station, with a supply of agricultural implements and teams of oxen for distribution to the native farmers, who are taught intensive agricultural work. One hundred and twenty schools have been opened and others will be by and by, where an Albanian teacher teaches to read and write the long-exiled Albanian letters; and instruction in Italian is also on hand, with which language most of the inhabitants are familiar, on account of the proximity of the Italian coast. It is foreseen that the hospitals and other buildings which have been erected by Italy will be turned into schools, farms or to industrial purposes after the war. The national Albanian flag (the eagle of Scanderbeg on the red field) flies freely from the municipal buildings, and all the customs and religious beliefs of the people have been carefully considered and respected.

The same fight for sanitation and civilization is going on with characteristic simplicity and absence of advertising all over the ground held by the Italian troops, at Delvino, at Premeti, at Selenitsa, or, to make it brief, everywhere south of the Vojussa River, which is generally held to be the ground covered by Italy; precise information beyond these limits being subordinate to military censorship. This district at least does not suffer ill-

health, nor moral nor material hunger; food-stores, schools, hospitals are there; a native police corps under the guidance of Italian officials is preparing itself for future efficiency; motor-car services connect towns and villages and bring the mails; and all the municipal offices are in the hands of prominent native citizens.

And one may reasonably wonder whether conditions are in any way to be compared to these, north of the Vojussa, and especially where the Austrians camp. But, then, comparisons will be possible to outsiders when the whole of Albania will be freed from the fighting armies that now stand on her mangled soil. Meanwhile, Italy evidently believes in leaving a trace of civilization and a good record for herself where she happens to be.

DALMATIA, FIUME AND THE OTHER UNREDEEMED LANDS OF THE ADRIATIC¹

All the "unredeemed" lands of the Adriatic coast have century-old Italian traditions dating back to their earliest Latin inhabitants. Even at Fiume, where until recent years, the Latin tradition seemed least certain, recent excavations have shown that the original seed, which later on had such a vigorous fruition, was sown by Rome.

Geographically not only eastern Friuli and Istria as far as the old classic frontier of Arsa, but also Fiume and Dalmatia are Italian, for they are situated on this side of the watershed which divides the affluents of the Danube from those rivers which flow into the Adriatic.

We shall briefly indicate further on how Italian is the civilization of these lands. Culture, geography, and history are the factors which detract from the purely numerical importance of statistics in those parts where they seem unfavorable to the Italians. But even statistics support Italian claims in a large portion of these "unredeemed" lands despite the systematic bad faith of the Government which compiled them.

FRIULI, TRIESTE AND ISTRIA

Geography.—The fact that these lands belong geographically to the Appenine Peninsula is not seriously disputed even by German geographers. The fact has been universally admitted for thousands of years.

The mountains and hills which rise on the further side of the Isonzo cannot be said to constitute the geographical frontier of a region because the Isonzo, which in its upper stretches might seem to form such a boundary, flows

¹A Historical and Statistical Study. Reprinted from the *Idea Democratica*, November 11, 1916.

further down through a plain, and because the great Alpine chains stretch much further east, where they take the name of the Julian Alps.

The Julian Alps clearly divide eastern Friuli and the territory of Gorizia from the Carniola. The division is distinct even as regards the character of the landscape which, on this side of the Alps, is thoroughly Italian.

Starting from Monte Nero the Julian Alps "follow, above Idria, the administrative boundary line between the coast and the province of Carniola, through the pass of Planina-Circhina. From Idria they run, mainly in a south-easterly direction, along the heights which command the road from Idria to Planina, near the river Uncia, dividing Italy from the Slav lands at the central pass of Longatico (*Unterloitsch*) and including, to the west, the forests of Tarnova and Piro. From Longatico skirting the western heights, they follow the Trieste-Laibach railway line as far as Postumia (which they leave to the west) following the administrative boundary line along the ridge of the Albi Mountains, whence they descend, embracing Fiume and some square miles of Croatia, and join the sea at about the level of Buccari, opposite the head-land of San Marco, which is part of the Italian territory."²

History.—As stated above the Italian traditions of eastern Friuli, of Trieste and Istria as of all other parts of Italy, are handed down from Latin civilisation.

The Roman town of Aquileia destroyed by Attila and rebuilt by its patriarchs under the reign of the Lombard kings, long held sway over all Friuli (Forum Juli) often extending its supremacy not only over the neighboring lands of Istria, but even over the province of Trent.

The temporal power first conferred on the Patriarchs of Aquileia, with a donation of lands by Charlemagne, and confirmed in 1077 and in 1093 by Henry IV, was abrogated by Venice in 1420 but the parliament of the *Meliores*

²Scipio Slataper: "I confini necessari all'Italia." Turin, 1915.

Patriae terrae Forumjuli continued in existence although with limited functions.

The ecclesiastical patriarchate was abolished in 1753, and its lands and revenues were divided between the diocese of Venitian Udine and Gorizia, which, two and a half centuries before, had been illegally bequeathed to the Hapsburgs by the counts of Gorizia, vassals of the patriarchate.

Trieste, the Tergestes of the Romans, which since the fall of the Empire had been a Latin municipality, subject later on to the Patriarchs of Aquileia, afterwards to other Bishop Barons, to whom it was given as a feud by the kings of Italy, at last became a free Italian commune. And such it remained until after 1382 when, by fraud and violence, this town also was subjected to the dominion of the Hapsburgs.

At the end of the tenth century the maritime towns of Istria met with the same fate as Trieste, until they were conquered by Venice which held them until her downfall in 1797.

The inland territory of Istria remained under the suzerainty of the Patriarchate until the thirteenth century, when it passed into the hands of the counts of Gorizia and was bequeathed by them (illegally, for it belonged to the Patriarchate) to the Hapsburgs.

In portions of this territory the Slav ethnic element succeeded in establishing itself as far back as the second half of the seventh century; but almost everywhere it underwent that inevitable transformation which has at all times befallen the barbarians who have descended into Italy. A considerable part of the Slavs now settled in Istria were imported by the Venetians to repopulate territories devastated by epidemics, or came there as the result of asylum granted to the Bosnian and Morlacchian refugees who fled before the Turks.

But neither the natural migratory movement of the Slav populations toward the sea, nor the immigrants called thither by Venice—whose indifference to nationality,

natural in those times, in regard to Istria and Dalmatia is well known—would have sufficed to form in the inland districts of Istria and in eastern Friuli, a numerical majority of Slavs, had it not been for the assistance of the Austrian Government, which, impotent to Germanise the coast, did its best to Slavify it. Here and there it has succeeded in its intent, but the numerical preponderance acquired by the Slavs in *some parts* of eastern Istria, the Carso, and the mountainous district of eastern Friuli, is but recent and restricted to the rural districts only, leaving the culture of these regions what it always has been, *i.e.*, purely Italian. A Slav culture in eastern Friuli and in Istria *does not exist*, and the Slavs themselves can point to nothing to the contrary. From Aquileia, glorious witness to Roman civilization, to Pola with its temples to Rome and the Caesars, there is not on the coast or in the inland districts one single monument which is not either Roman, or Venetian, or modern Italian.

*Inhabitants*³.—The official Austrian statistics for 1910 return 90,119 Italian speaking inhabitants in eastern Friuli. The Slovacs, according to these same statistics, number 154,564. A calculation which may be considered reliable because it is based on electoral returns, gives, on the other hand, the following figures:

³In speaking of figures and numerical comparisons of populations we should remember to note the great importance of the fact that we can only refer to statistics compiled before the war. We are therefore discussing a situation which has since been profoundly modified, and which owing to these modifications, cannot be used as the basis for Italian claims. The Slav population immigrated, largely at the instigation of the Viennese government, into Italian lands and very probably it will follow this same government in its retreat. Thus the Carso today is deserted. How many Slovacs will wish to return to this corner of Italy become once more politically Italian? At Gorizia there were some thousands of Slavs (Slovacs, Croats, Serbs, Poles, Ruthenians, and Bohemians) whom Austria had forcibly placed in the government bureaus. Will any of these return? It is thus evident that under these conditions figures are poor arguments devoid of meaning.

Italians subject to Austria.....	112,000
Italians subject to Italy.....	8,000
Slavs.....	130,000
Germans.....	3,500

According to these figures the number of Italians is almost equal to that of the Slavs. But the Italians almost all belong to the urban population, they are the more highly educated and have therefore a distinctly higher national value. So notable is this superiority that even if they only numbered 90,000, as the Austrian statistics try to make out, the national character of these lands would not be changed, for it is and continues to be Italian.

The very name of *Eastern* or *Austrian Friuli* used in the official acts of the Vienna government, is proof that Goritian Friuli is an integral part of that Friuli already united to the mother-country.

At Trieste in 1910 the Austrian statistics show that out of 229,000 inhabitants, 118,959 are Italian, 56,916 Slovacs, and 11,856 Germans. To convince us that these like all the other figures of the Austrian census, are falsified, we need only look up the official returns of the 1900 census which gave 116,825 Italians, and 24,679 Slovacs. Nor is this all: the *K. K. Central Kommission für statistik* (of Vienna) in 1913 declared that the returns of the Austrian census at Trieste exaggerated the number of the Slav inhabitants.

The truth is that in 1910 the Italians of Trieste, inclusive of those who could claim Italian citizenship (almost all of whom were natives of Trieste) numbered 182,113, and the Slovacs who mostly dwell in the hilly section of the town, numbered 37,063, of whom over 45 per cent are immigrants of recent date.

In Istria the Austrian statistics place the number of Italians at 147,417, Slovacs 55,134, Croats 168,184. It is evident that these figures also need correcting. In Istria, as in eastern Friuli, the number of Italians is nearly equal to that of the Slavs; but here again the former account for the educated section of the population and form one national unit, whereas the Slavs are partly Croats

and partly Slovacs, that is to say they belong to peoples speaking different languages. Moreover, almost all the Slavs speak Italian and many of them speak dialects so full of Italian words that more than one glotologist has been in doubt whether to classify them among Italian or Slav dialects.

Considered as a whole, Friuli (Provinces of Gorizia and Gradisca), Trieste, and Istria, which are divided by no natural barrier and which should, therefore, be considered as forming one region, that of Julian Venetia, were inhabited in 1910 by over half a million Italians as against not more than 350,000 Croats and Slovacs. Nor does this take into account Fiume, which likewise forms part of Istria and, therefore, of Julian Venetia and where the Italians form 65 per cent of the population.

FIUME

Geography.—Fiume, situated at the eastern base of the Istrian peninsula, belongs geographically to Istria to which it belonged politically until 1776.

The eastern frontier of Istria, which some place at the Arsa, the original frontier of the tenth Augustean Region, is really formed by the watershed of the Julian Alps which descend to the sea at the *Canale della Montagna*, opposite the head-land of St. Mark, near the island of Veglia.

The boundary line formed by the Arsa had a purely administrative value in the time of Augustus; had it been the military frontier the Romans would not have built further east, for the defence of Italy, the two great *Valli* of the Julian Alps. The majestic ruins of one of these works can still be seen, following for some distance the course of the Fiumara, a stream which forms the political boundary line between Fiume and Croatia.

But, as stated above, the real geographical frontier lies further to the southeast, on the crest of the Julian Alps, and includes besides Fiume, the sea towns of Buccari and Portoré.

History.—Until February 1914, the origin of Fiume

was unknown. An arch between two houses in the old part of the town, traditionally known as the "Roman arch," and the junction on its present location of many Roman roads, as shown by the *Itinerari* and the geography of Claudius Ptolomy, afforded grounds for supposing it to be of Latin origin. The Italian dialect spoken by the native population could only have been a development of Latin, nor could its origin be ascribed to Venice, for Venice only governed Fiume for one year, from 1508 to 1509.

Nevertheless, many students of local history threw doubts on these suppositions, for none of the written documents relating to Fiume date back further than the thirteenth century. The old chronicles only speak of Tarsatica, destroyed in the year 800 by Charlemagne.

The discovery in 1914 of Roman remains under a house which was pulled down on the Corso removed all doubts. The majority now incline to identify Fiume with Tarsatica, rebuilt after its destruction, clear traces of which were found in the Roman foundations on which the mediaeval city was built.

The ancient Roman *Oppidum*, for such Tarsatica had been, reappears in the middle ages under the name of San Vito al Fiume, known later on as Fiume, a name which the Slavs translated by the word *Ricka* a Croatian word for water-course. San Vito is still the patron saint of the town to whom the principal church is dedicated.

Fiume, which was from its foundation a free municipality, was for some time under the dominion of the Franks, after which it became successively a fief of the archbishop of Pedana, of the bishop of Pola, of the lords of Duino, of the Hapsburgs, of the Lords of Walsee, and then again of the Hapsburgs.

All known documents relating to the city of Fiume bear witness to its uninterruptedly Italian character, which victoriously survived the Slav invasion in the seventh century which, for a time, seemed to have submerged everything.

In 1776 Maria Theresa made over Fiume to Hungary

and—as a result of the protests of the inhabitants—a royal decree of April 23, 1779, proclaimed it to be a “separate body annexed to the crown of the kingdom of Hungary.”

In 1848 it was taken from Hungary by the Croats of the Bano Jelacic, who held on to it for nineteen years without succeeding, spite of tenacious endeavors, in undermining its Italian character, and in 1867, on the dualistic settlement between Austria and Hungary, it was restored to this latter.

At present Fiume is governed on the basis of a “provisional arrangement.”

In 1863 the so-called “deputations of the kingdom of Hungary, Croatia and Fiume” met at Budapest and decided that “the free city of Fiume and its territory” should remain, in accordance with the charter of 1779, a separate body provisionally annexed to Hungary “*corpus separatum adnexum sacrae Regni coronae.*”

In the first years after 1868 the autonomy and the Italian character of Fiume were respected. But for nearly twenty years the Italians of Fiume, harassed on all sides, struggling against the Croats and the Magyars who have done everything in their power to denationalize them, have been engaged in a desperate but so far victorious fight in defence of their threatened Italian nationality.

Inhabitants.—The Italian character of Fiume is irrefutably proven, even by the government census returns.

These figures show that in 1910 there were 24,000 Italians in Fiume (exclusive of some 6,000 Italian citizens most of them natives of Fiume), 12,000 Slavs (Croats, Serbs, and some Slovacs) and 6,400 Magyars.

The fact is that before the war at least 35,000 of the 54,000 inhabitants of Fiume were Italians, that is to say 65 per cent as compared to 28 per cent of Slavs and 6 per cent of Magyars.

Economically speaking Fiume is of the greatest importance to any nation which wishes to command the Adriatic. Only some 50 kilometers from Trieste as the crow flies, and connected up with the railway system of St.

Pietro along which run the express trains from Fiume to Vienna and from Trieste to Vienna, this Adriatic town could easily gain command of all the commerce of the Trieste *hinterland*. It is therefore necessary that the country which is to possess Trieste, *i.e.*, Italy, should also hold Fiume. From this point of view Fiume may be considered the economic fulcrum of the Adriatic. Without Fiume the economic supremacy of Italy on the Adriatic would always be unreal.

Strategically Fiume is of great importance, not so much for the command of the seas—for the country which holds the Quarnero Islands holds the keys to the Adriatic—but because without Fiume Italy would be deprived of the natural barrier of the Julian Alps, the only valid obstacle to future possible invasions, and the geographic unity of Julian Venetia would be disrupted.

Besides this, it is certain that a hostile fleet assembled by some means or other at Fiume (the case of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* is instructive) would threaten the rear of the Italian fleet and by detaining a portion of it in the Northern Adriatic or in the Quarnero, would prevent the free and complete movement of the whole.

Let us add that in time the ship-building yards of Fiume, if in hands other than Italian, might build either war ships or ships convertible into armed cruisers. In short Fiume would contain the germs for the development of a maritime activity which would aim first at rivalling, then at injuring, the Italian navy.

Nationally speaking Fiume may be considered, as Rome formerly considered Tarsatica, as an advanced sentinel of our race. Fiume is a Latin fortress which has withstood for centuries the attacks of diverse peoples; it is a centre radiating Italian culture on the borders of Italy; it is the eastern vertex of the "fated triangle" (Trieste, Pola, Fiume); it is one of the three hinges of Italianism in Istria. Should Fiume be abandoned to Croatia or to Hungary the national character of Istria would be endangered in the whole of its eastern section.

And this would be all the more shameful to our nation

inasmuch as Fiume, when Italy either did not exist or could not act, struggled on alone for its national and political autonomy. Ever since 1776 when a decree annexing the city to Hungary seemed to base this annexation on the supposition that the town belonged to Croatia, until 1914, Fiume has always asserted its complete independence from all connection with Croatia. Until the end of the eighteenth century the Croats themselves recognized that Fiume did not belong to Croatia. In 1779 the Chancellery at Vienna recognized indirectly that Fiume belonged to Italy. In 1882 that same Chancellery denied that Fiume was Croatian. Until the outbreak of the European war the inhabitants of Fiume themselves continued, amidst struggles and sacrifices of all kinds, to repeat this negation.

The *National Committee for Fiume and Quarnero* formed by exiles, and the many Fiume volunteers now fighting on the Carso and on the Alps, afford the latest and most solemn evidence of the Italian character of this city.

THE COAST FROM FIUME TO DALMATIA

The watershed between the Danube and the Adriatic divides the Croatian coast between Fiume and Dalmatia from the *hinterland*. But so inconsiderable is the distance which separates this drainage area from the coast that it could only be held with difficulty by a state which had not possession of the *hinterland*.

The coast line between Fiume and Dalmatia extends for a length of some 130 kilometers and boasts some good harbors which would be more than sufficient for the needs of an independent Croatia.

Segna, for instance (the *Senia* of the Romans), which, like Buccari and Portorè, has not yet quite lost its ancient Italian character,⁴ is not more than 40 kilometers distance

⁴The free commune of Segna had its *Podestà* as early as the year 1200, and only thirty years ago Buccari, which is now considered a thoroughly Croatian town, according to the census made by the Croats, had 30 per cent of Italian natives. What has become of them? It is a fact that all the peasants at Buccari speak Italian.

as the crow flies from the railway system of Ogulia, as compared to the 65 kilometers which separate that railway from Fiume.

This is stated to show that the Croatsians—if they have possession of their own coast—have not even a pretext for claiming Fiume in the name of their economic needs, just as Hungary, cut off from the sea by at least 300 kilometers of Croatian territory, cannot justly lay claim to that city. It should be noted that Croatia's share in the traffic of the port of Fiume only amounts to 4 per cent of the annual movement and that to reach the port of Fiume the Croatian railway has to make a *détour* which it could avoid were it to run to its own sea coast.

DALMATIA

Geography.—Dalmatia is an Adriatic territory and as such belongs to the orohydrographic system of Italy.

Throughout the innumerable islands of its archipelago it displays the same geological and morphological features as Istria. It is clearly divided from the Balkan peninsula by a high chain of mountains almost everywhere rising above 1500 meters.

The studies made by Prof. Danielli of Florence on the flora and fauna of Dalmatia show that the Dinaric Alps divide two very different regions, one of which, Dalmatia, preserves all the characteristics of the Italian lands.

Dalmatia, cut off from the Balkans by the mountains, is joined to Italy by the sea, and some particulars, studied with great interest by geologists, lead to the supposition that the Adriatic, before it became a sea, was a continuation of the Paduan plain. Even now the Adriatic seems less like a sea than a great lake within the territory which is bounded to the east by the Julian and the Dinaric Alps and to the west by the Apennines.

There is only one gate open in this mountain barrier, that of the Narenta. But this does not mean that the Narenta is *necessarily* a frontier. South of this river, Hertzegovina stretches in two points to the sea, at the

bay of Neum-Klek, north of Ragusa, and at Suttorino at the Bocche di Cattaro. The country which shall possess Herzegovina will therefore have two natural outlets in the southern Adriatic.

History.—Peopled by Illyrians, with some Greek colonies on the sea coast, Dalmatia was Roman from the second century B.C. until the fall of the Western Empire. Four Roman Emperors were Dalmatian, amongst whom was Diocletian, founder of Spalato.

On the fall of Rome it was in Dalmatia that the Western Empire still survived for some decades.

The Dalmatian cities, prosperous Latin communities, governed themselves freely even after the fall of Rome, obeying their own laws and statutes which were purely Italo-Roman in character, untainted by German barbaric feudalism. At first they were under the protection of the Roman Empire of the East, and subsequently they became independent republics, following the example of the free Italian communes. In 1409 they passed definitely under Venetian rule, which retained suzerainty over them until 1797, though they always retained their municipal autonomy. Like Rome, Venice conquered Dalmatia, determined thereto by the absolute necessity of commanding the Adriatic, a command essential to the life of Italy.

Ragusa alone remained an independent republic until 1808. The history of this small republic is truly glorious for the prosperity of its maritime trade and the splendor of its arts and letters; but here again its history is purely Italian, although a characteristic Slavo-Italian dialect, the "*raguseo*" gradually spread among the people. The public life of Ragusa was, until 1908, always Italian.

Toward the year 1000 small Slav principalities arose in the inland part of Dalmatia; their rule however never extended to the coast towns, which always remained free and Italian. Indeed these insignificant Slavonic lordships soon became Italian, so that Venice was able to assume undisputed rule over the whole of Dalmatia.

In 1855 Dalmatia came under Austrian rule as having formed part of the Kingdom of Italy of Napoleon I.

The French treated Dalmatia as Italian territory even when they united it to the brief-lived Illyrian provinces.

Austria respected the Italian character of Dalmatia until 1866; but after the loss of Lombardy and Venetia a policy was adopted which aimed at fostering the Croatian element in this region. Little by little, by means of unheard of violence and fraud, the municipalities of the Dalmatian cities, which had been Italian for centuries, passed into the hands of the Slavs; in 1870 Sebenico, in 1883 Spalato (the last *podestà* of Spalato, Dr. Antonio Balamonti, was a distinguished writer and patriot), in 1897 Cattaro (*podestà* Pezzi), in 1899 Ragusa (*podestà* Baron Gondola), and so forth and so on. Courageous Zara alone managed to hold out, and preserved intact its Italian patrimony and Italian municipality until Austria, taking advantage of the present war, dissolved the town council.

But ever since the Croatian invasion of Dalmatia was begun, as the several centres of resistance gradually passed into the hands of the loyalist Slavs, the government at Vienna, and with its consent, and sometimes without it, the Slavs themselves, closed the Italian schools so as to deprive the Italian populations even of this essential spiritual nutriment. Zara alone, proudly withstanding all assaults, was able to keep her schools. In all the rest of Dalmatia no Italian schools remained except those privately supported by citizens at their own expense by means of the National Leagues.

Religion.—Dalmatia, like Fiume, has been Catholic ever since the days of the Apostles. The members of the Orthodox Church in Dalmatia are about 90,000, almost all descendents of fugitives who settled at Cattaro or on the Bosnian frontier, driven there by the Ottoman armies.

Civilization.—Dalmatian civilization is solely and exclusively Latin and Italian. The eastern Balcanic civilization begins on the further side of the Dinaric watershed, which forms the natural frontier between the Balkans and Dalmatia.

The contribution which Dalmatia has in all times given to the Italian motherland in sciences, letters, civil and military arts, is indeed notable.

St. Jerome, author of the Vulgate, was a Dalmatian; the first Italian grammarian (XVI century) was Fortunio of Sebenico; the bishop of Traù, De Dominis, a precursor of Newton in his solar studies, whose body was burnt in Rome in the *Campo de' Fiori*, was a native of Arbe; Traù was the birthplace of distinguished humanists of the sixteenth century and the historian Giovanni Lucio was born there in 1663. He proclaimed in his works the Latin antecedents of Dalmatia and was perhaps the first Italian historian who based his studies on purely scientific lines. Before his time a powerful Latin mind, the archdeacon Tomaso of Spalato, affirmed in the thirteenth century the Latin character of the Dalmatian cities, as opposed to the Slavs. At the close of the fifteenth century the Latinity of Dalmatia found another powerful advocate in Elia Lampridio Cerva of Ragusa, a Latin poet who was crowned on the Capitol. Elio Saraca, the friend of Ariosto, was from Ragusa; Giorgio Benigno, the friend of Lorenzo the Magnificent, was a Dalmatian; the celebrated Italian astronomer Boscovitch, is from Ragusa. The same town boasts Marino Ghetaldi, the Italian innovator in mathematics of the sixteenth century; Baglivi, the great Italian medical innovator of the seventeenth century; Seismit Doda, the Italian economist and minister who resigned in 1889 on account of his *irredentist* opinions when the Triple Alliance was in its zenith. Zara gave birth to the naturalists Visiani and Paravia; Adolfo Mussafia, one of the founders of Romance philology, was born at Spalato, and one of the best known Dante scholars, Lubin, is from Traù, while many Dalmatians are well-known literary men even at the present time.

But for the literary glory of Dalmatia it would suffice to mention Ugo Foscolo, who received all his early education at Spalato, and Niccolò Tommaseo of Sebenico.

The literature of Ragusa is also nine-tenths Italian,

although for some years past Serbians and Croatians—exaggerating the importance of some minor poets who besides writing in Italian and in Latin also used the Italo-Slavic dialect of the town—strive to spread the belief that the Ragusa republic is a cradle of Serbian literature.

This exaggeration has been carried so far as to proclaim these poets and writers as the founders of Serbo-Croatian literature.

As a matter of fact they are only simple and modest translators or imitators of their Italian contemporaries. Their poetry which grew up and died in Ragusa between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is a mere Slavic parenthesis in the record of Dalmatian-Italian civilization and never had any influence on Serbian and Croatian literature, which does not date further back than 1800. The chief productions of this over-lauded Slavic literary era are the *Osmanide*, and the *Dubravka* of Gondola, which are tame imitations of Tasso's *Gerusalemme* and *Aminta*. And be it noted that Gondola, whose name has recently been converted by the Serbs into Gundalio, was an Italian; all the original documents at Ragusa give his name only as follows: "Giovanni, son of Francesco Gondola." Equally Italian are the names of the other poets (Mauro Vitrani, Sigismondo Menze, Giorgio Dersa, Giulio Palmotta, Pietro Canavelli, etc.) who, as a historian of Ragusa says, made a study of the languages of the bordering peoples.

Fine Arts.—All the Dalmatian cities, even the small towns of the archipelago, are real gems of Latin and Italian art. One of the most beautiful is Ragusa, situated in a picturesque and highly fertile district. The palace of Diocletian at Spalato, and the two cathedrals of Traù and Sebenico, the cathedral of Zara, and the palace of the Rectors at Ragusa, are undoubtedly real masterpieces in the national art treasury of Italy.

Nor are these specimens of an imported art, but the spontaneous productions of Italian artists born and bred in the country. The cathedral of Sebenico, the portico of the Palace of the Rectors at Ragusa, the chapel of St.

Anastasia at Spalato, are the masterpieces of Giorgio Orsini, known as Giorgio da Sebenico although born at Zara; the most beautiful statues and the finest carving in the doors of Spalato are pure Romanic work of the Dalmatian Guvina; the monumental entrance to the cathedral of Traù is by the Dalmatian Radovano, one of the greatest Romanic sculptors, a purely Latin genius.

Orsini, the greatest of Dalmatian artificers, a powerful architect and sculptor, is a forerunner of the best forms of Renaissance art; the brothers Laurana, one a sculptor, the other an architect, pupils of Orsini, and the painter Andrea Mendolla of Sebenico, are among the most notable artists of our Renaissance.

Few things offer such vivid proof of the historic Italian character of Dalmatia as the innovating and brilliantly personal contribution which the two Dalmatian artists above mentioned, Giorgio, son of Matteo Orsini, and Luciano Laurana his pupil, the architect of the town hall at Urbino, and in his turn master of Bramante, made to the Renaissance.

Economy.—The economic life of Dalmatia is almost entirely in the hands of the Italian bourgeoisie, and consequently is part of the national wealth of Italy.

Landed property in the north and the center as far as the Narenta, is two-thirds Italian, and in the islands is entirely so. The Slavs are peasants, either renters or métayers. And even south of the Narenta there are large Italian estates.

The three leading industries in Dalmatia, the cement trade (Spalato), hydraulic power works (Falls of the Kerka and of the Cetina at Sebenico and Spalato), and the liqueur trade (*maraschino* of Zara and of Spalato) are almost exclusively in Italian hands, representing an investment of hundreds of millions of Italian capital. The same holds good of the minor industries such as the wax trade, the *maccheroni* factories, the manufacture of insecticides, etc., etc.

In commerce also the more important business houses

are Italian, and all the navigation companies have been founded by Italians.

Inhabitants.—As stated above the Italians of Dalmatia are autoctonous, the descendants of Roman settlers and of Illyrian (not Slavonic) natives Latinised by the Roman conquest. In the fourth century of our era all Dalmatia was Latin. The Tchech professor, Jirecek, in his "*Denkschriften*" of the Vienna academy (No. 48-49a, 1901), the German Mayer Lubke, and the Istrian Matteo Bartoli in the proceedings of the Academy, spite of the wishes and requests of the Austrian government, have shown the uninterrupted continuity in the evolution of the Latin language and nationality in Dalmatia from the times of the Romans to our day. In the middle-ages Dalmatia had a neo-Latin dialect of its own, designated by these writers as "neo-Dalmatic," later on absorbed and transformed by the Venetian dialect which spread all along the eastern coast of the Adriatic.

Until 1898, that is to say not more than eighteen years ago, an old man, Antonio Udina, was living at Veglia, who still spoke "neo-Dalmatic."

Thus in the fourth century Dalmatia was still entirely Latin, only in the seventh and eighth centuries did Slav populations begin to filter in, devastating the country by their incursions.

The Slav immigration was more considerable in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under the pressure of the Turks.

According to calculations of that period, the population of Dalmatia, including the islands, amounted toward the close of the fifteenth century, as shown by the reports of the Venetian Provisors to their government, to 60,000 souls. As the towns and villages were inhabited by Italians it is evident that the number of Slavs then in Dalmatia was inconsiderable, and that it was only increased by subsequent immigrations, due to Turkish invasions and to the colonizing activity of Venice.

Undoubtedly Turkey was the prime cause of the increase

of the Slav population in Dalmatia, driving crowds of fugitives to seek refuge from Bosnia; the second cause was Austria. Under Austrian rule the number of Slavs in Dalmatia has increased three-fold.

Before the Slav invasion caused by the Turks the Latin character of Dalmatia had been strengthened by many thousands of Rumanians (Mauro-Walachians, Morlachians) who have now disappeared. It is, moreover, evident that all the Rumanian districts in the mountains, and the Italian centers in the Dalmatian cities nearest to the Dinaric Alps, were first devastated by the Turks and then settled by them exclusively with Slavo-Turkish people from whom at least two-thirds of the Dalmatian Slavs descend.

At the time of the early Slav immigrations the Italians remained in the towns and villages, where they formed the middle and upper classes. Later on their number was increased by Italians who settled there after the Venetian conquest and by Slavs Italianized by city life. Only the peasantry, out of touch with the middle classes, preserved its language.

And this is still the case; the bourgeoisie speaks Italian in home and public life; the peasants speak a Slav dialect which they call "our language" and which, with some local variations, is a Serbo-Croatian jargon full of Italian idioms.

As a result of the political struggles between Italians and Slavs, fomented by Austria since 1886, many middle class Italians were induced by economic considerations to pass over to the Slav camp. When we are told that side by side with the Croats who bear Italian names there are Italians whose names were originally Slav, it is necessary to draw a careful distinction; the Italians belong to families which became Italian during the period of Venetian rule or later, but always as the result of a natural process due to the Italian environment. But the Croats with Italian names are nearly all renegades of the last hour, turncoats who went over to the Croats after 1866, frequently for sordid reasons.

But in speaking of Dalmatian Slavs we should never forget that almost all are Catholics and anti-Serbian, and do not wish to be anything but Dalmatian. With the exception of a few hundred "intellectual" Dalmatian Slavs who are Serbophiles, and who are set off by the thousands and thousands of "intellectual" Dalmatian Italians, the rural masses of Dalmatia are devoid of national conscience, and are blindly loyal to Austria for which they have fought fiercely during the present war against the orthodox Serbs, whom they consider as "pagans." The Dalmatian peasants, who were among the best defenders of Venice a hundred years ago, will become—when the unnatural hatred of everything Italian fomented by the Austrians will have subsided—excellent Italian citizens, whereas they would never adapt themselves to be governed by a people whose civilization is inferior to their own.

Thus not even the argument of numbers can be adduced in favor of the Serbian claims to Dalmatia, claims which have been brought forward during the last two or three years, whereas the Italian aspirations to Dalmatia date back to the year in which that province was definitely lost, that is to say to 1815, since when they have never subsided.

How recent are the unjustifiable claims brought forward by the Serbians to Dalmatia is proved moreover by an important and irrefutable historical document.

The ex-president of the Bulgarian council, Ivan E. Ghescioff (Guéchoff) published a few months ago a volume of papers illustrating the Balkan alliance against Turkey in 1912-13 (*L'Alliance Balkanique*, Hachette, Paris, 1915).

Needless to say there can be no doubt as to the authenticity of the documents; the name of Ghescioff (a Russophile and friend of the *Entente*) is sufficient guarantee; nor have any denials been published, although the book aroused much attention when it appeared.

Ghescioff, then, with the consent of his King, had a conference with the then President of the Serbian cabinet, who was also Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milovanovic,

to lay the foundation for the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. The conference, prepared by the Minister Plenipotentiary Rizoff, was held during the night of October 11, 1911, on the train between Belgrade and Lapovo. Ghescioff now publishes the report of this conference which he transmitted to the Bulgarian King and Ministry. On page 27 of this report we read these precise words, spoken in *tête à tête* by Milovanovic, formerly Minister Plenipotentiary at Rome, to his Bulgarian colleague (a Jugo-Slav like himself!): "If, simultaneously with the settlement of Turkey the disintegration of Austria-Hungary were to occur, Serbia would obtain Bosnia and Hertze-govina and Rumania would obtain Transylvania."

Not one word about Serbian claims to Dalmatia! They have only just arisen, and they have been fostered . . . against Italy!

And here it is well to remember that Milovanovic himself (then Minister of Foreign Affairs) in October, 1909, when interviewed at Belgrade by Dr. Alexander Dudan, correspondent of the *Tribuna*, in the presence of the Serbian poet Ducic, now secretary to the Serbian legation at Athens, made the following declaration: "The Croa-tians of Dalmatia in their anti-Italian agitation, are the mere agents and tools of the Austrian police, to make mischief between Italy and the Slav world, more especially between Italy and Serbia."

The "Jugoslav" claims to Dalmatia are as recent as they are unfounded. "Jugoslavism" is the latest Austrian find, which aims at drawing the Serbians within its orbit, absorbing them in a triplicist movement (Austria-Hun-gary-Jugoslavia). There is no such thing as a Jugoslav nation, and there is no history, nor language, nor literature which bears that name. The newly-coined word (jug= south; Jugoslavi=southern Slavs) is a mere longitudinal indication. The people neither knows nor understands it. It includes Bulgarians, Serbians, Croatians, Monte-negrans, and Slovacs, that is to say five histories, three languages (Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, Slovak), two re-

ligions (Orthodox for the Bulgarians, Serbians, and Montenegrans; Catholic for the others), five separate national consciences. Dalmatia cannot be included in any way in this artificial conception of a Yugoslav nation.

It should be noted that Austria-Hungary founded the first and only Royal (King Franz Joseph) Yugoslav Academy of science and art at Zagrab (the Croatian capital) and that the first Yugoslav press agency was, and still is, that founded in Vienna and paid for by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as the "*Südslavische Corrispondenz*," an agency for the propaganda of the Austrian Yugoslav idea, and that the group of Slovak and Croatian deputies in the Vienna *Reichsrat* (parliament), presided over by the Austrophil clerical deputy Sustersic, the trusted henchman of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand assassinated at Sarajevo, was and is known as the "Jugo Slav Club" (*Südslaven Club*). These were the three propagandist agencies of the Yugoslav idea which is Austrophil, anti-Italian, and anti-Serbian. These are the scientific and artistic, political, and press organs which represent all the political and intellectual activities of the Southern Slavs.

In short, the few Croatian and Slovak agitators who, under the pretext of Jugo-Slavism tour the capitals of the allied countries, carrying on a propaganda directed more especially against Italian aspirations on the Adriatic, and decrying our country, our army, our navy, and our institutions cannot—spite of the high sounding titles of deputy and *ex-podestà* which they make so much of, be said to represent either the Croatians or the Slovacs of Austria-Hungary, and still less can they be said to represent the friends or the allies of the Entente. This is so because, in the first place, until the European war broke out these very agitators were the instruments of Austrian policy directed against Italy and against Serbia.

In the second place, because the very Croatian and Slovak political parties to which they belonged until the outbreak of the war, and their political colleagues (presi-

dents of provinces, and of provincial parliaments, deputies and *podestàs*) still continue, after two years of war, to be the agents and servants of the Austrian and Hungarian governments; they still continue to support Vienna and Budapest, and consequently Berlin, in the war against Italy, Russia, Serbia and all the Allies. We will here mention as samples of the Croatian parties which still support the Austrian government, the *Hrvatska stranka* (the Croatian party in Dalmatia, presided over until the beginning of the war by M. Trumbic, now president of the Yugoslav Committee of London and Paris) the *Srpsko-hrvátska Koalicija* (the Serbo-Croatian coalition in Croatia, founded, amongst others, by Messrs. Supilo and Hinkovic, who together with M. Trumbic are now the leaders of the Yugoslav Committee).⁵

All these Croatian and Slovak parties are in full accord with the Croatian and Slavonian troops who fight for Austria-Hungary against the armies of the allies. And here we must remind the reader that Croatia enjoys a large measure of autonomy under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and has its own territorial militia, or *Landwehr*, entirely Croatian from the private to the commander, and the bulletin of September 26, 1916, of the Austrian General Staff stated that this Croatian *Landwehr* was fighting heroically in the Transylvanian Alps against the Rumanians, whereas it is well known that the Italian and Czech soldiers, incorporated in mixed regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, have always deserted when they could from those hated ranks.

In view of these facts it should be remembered that the Italians of the "unredeemed" provinces have always con-

⁵ In the *Journal des Débats* of November 25, 1916, Mr. Trumbic signs a manifesto of the Yugoslav Committee as "President of the Serbo-Croatian parliamentary commission in the Dalmatian Diet." This is another lie, and an international one! . . . There never has been a "Serbo-Croatian coalition" either in the Diet or in the country. Mr. Trumbic was only the President of the Croatian clerical party "of the right" and, later on, of the Croatian governmental party in Dalmatia, known as *Havatska stranka*.

sistently followed an anti-Austrian policy, and even that section which, like the clerical party in the Trentino, seemed more tepid nationalists, as soon as the Italians declared war on Austria proclaimed their nationalism in no uncertain terms. Not one of the political organs of the Italians has been respected by Austria; all have been dissolved, all the leaders have been interned as enemies of the State; even the Hon. Coaci, the leader of the clerical party in the Trentino, and ex-vice-president of the Austrian Chamber, and the Prince-Bishop of Trent, Mons. Endrici, have shared this fate.

During the war Dalmatia has given Italy a number of volunteers, and the first martyr of the *irredenti*, Francesco Rismondo of Spalato, on the outbreak of hostilities, gave up his family—wealthy shipowners, who had joined the Austro-Croatian party—enrolled himself at once in our army, and fell seriously wounded on the Carso. He was taken prisoner by the Austrians and executed by the hangman of Franz-Joseph.

Assuredly none of us would consent to sacrifice these heroic brothers of ours to the tricks of a few Croatian and Slovak political agitators.

The Austrian census, drawn up by Austro-Croatian agents, only returns 20,000 Italians out of a population of 620,000 inhabitants. But there are at least 60,000 Italians in Dalmatia exclusive of those who are Italian subjects. This figure is obtained from the electoral returns for 1911 in which the Italian candidates obtained 10 per cent of the total poll. And, be it remembered, the Italians only voted as a matter of principle but without hope of success; which would lead us to suppose that the number of Italians is yet more considerable. The Italian speaking inhabitants amount to 200,000, and it may be said that the only Dalmatians who do not understand Italian are the illiterates who can neither read nor write.⁶

⁶ Those who raise conscientious objections with regard to the Slav-speaking populations who would be embodied in greater Italy, would do well to remember the two million German speaking inhabitants of Alsace Lorraine who will return to France, the three

Strategical Considerations.—Dalmatia is essential to the safety of Italy on the Adriatic. And, be it noted, we say Dalmatia and not only the islands, which it would be impossible to defend economically and strategically if they were divided from the mainland. Such a division would be a national injustice to the Dalmatians, and a source of constant unrest.

The Catholic Dalmatians are confirmed adversaries of the Serbs. All who are acquainted with the real conditions of this province know that the dread of a Serbian nationalist movement in Italian Dalmatia is absurd. The vast majority of the Slavo-Dalmatian population has always been opposed to the Serbians, and, as is shown by innumerable facts, to all union with Croatia.

But if Dalmatia were to remain separated from Italy, the Italian nationalist movement, which has always existed, would continue to subsist, and would become all the more vigorous, passionate and turbulent as the growing importance of Italy would render its ideal ever more vivid, intense, and fascinating.

It must be remembered that from a military standpoint the coast is the key to power on the Adriatic. Pola is of importance only for the protection of Trieste and Fiume, and its value is defensive.

The ports which are valuable for an offensive against the Italian coast are the two formidable harbors of Sebenico and Cattaro. The islands are only the outlying works of those ports.

The present war has clearly demonstrated this fact. All the attacks against our shores have been made from those two ports. The numberless traps and snares which those two ports can lay among the islands and the channels which divide them, paralyze the activity of the allied fleets in the Adriatic. So true is it that the islands are of no avail against the power which holds Sebenico that the

to four million Germans who will form part of the future kingdom of Bohemia, the Germans of Poland, the Bulgarians in Serbian Macedonia, the Turks and Greeks in Constantinople and Asia Minor, to mention only the transformations of the near future.

allies have not taken the trouble to occupy even one of them.

In conclusion, the purpose of Italy is not to defend herself against a danger which threatens her in the Eastern Adriatic but to do away once and for all with that danger. Her purpose is to secure for herself absolute freedom in her own sea.

Like Rome and Venice, Italy needs Dalmatia to ensure her peace and safety.

CONCLUSION

Italy, after defeating Austria-Hungary must claim all the lands embraced between the Adriatic and the Julian and Dinaric Alps, *i.e.*, eastern Friuli, Istria with Trieste and Fiume, and all Dalmatia; whilst leaving to the Croats and to the Serbians commercial ports of their own on the Adriatic.

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ITALY AT THE PIAVE

BY DIANA WATTS

January 2, 1918

Official communications are practically powerless to convey any true understanding of a national disaster. This is the case in connection with the recent tragic events on the Italian front—and it occasionally happens that an unimportant unofficial person who has lived through such events, is able to change entirely a point of view resulting from preconceived notions.

That there exists already a generous desire on the part of America to help her ally cannot be doubted. The proofs exist in the shape of immense hospital supplies, trainloads of which left the Paris branch of the American Red Cross immediately after the disaster on the Italian front—and in many other ways which daily augment in importance.

But only with actual contact is it possible to realize the spirit of a people or appreciate the changes wrought by disaster and grief—it thus happens that accounts written by private persons who have actually lived through moments of national disaster are able to transmit a far truer impression than any number of official dispatches controlled and restrained for political reasons.

This is the object of the present article, which endeavors to make clear a few essential facts which appear to be unknown in America. It is still not uncommon to hear Italy blamed for her delay in entering the war, and for her selfishness in choosing the moment most convenient to herself.

The facts prove that these accusations are absolutely groundless. Italy's situation at the outbreak of hostilities was an extremely complex one, which probably

accounts for its having been little known and less understood. The treaty binding her as an ally of Austria and Germany, was a purely defensive one—it precluded entirely any act of aggression on the part of any one of the three countries concerned, and at the moment of extreme tension which followed the declaration of war by Austria upon Serbia, Italy and England, by their special positions were the balancing powers of each party. France and Russia were definitely bound by treaty to uphold each other. England, though tied by no treaty, was morally bound to side with France.

Germany and Austria had secretly agreed upon a definitely aggressive policy, and in the initial stages of the conflict, when there seemed to be some faint chance of averting general hostilities, England on her side conferred with France and Russia, as a friend counselling reflection and caution, while Italy made representations to her two allies emphasizing the illegality of any aggressive action under the existing treaty of the Triple Alliance.

When Germany actually declared war against France, Italy was as completely ignorant of, and unprepared for such a move, as the rest of the world, and although the treaty which bound her to Austria and Germany had only recently been renewed the first important step she took was one of withdrawal from any share in the action, and a denunciation of her allies.

This withdrawal was a tacit proof of sympathy with the Entente powers, but she did more than this—she intimated to France her willingness to withdraw all troops from the Franco-Italian frontier, and passed her word of honor, allowing the French to liberate a number of their troops and cannon which contributed largely to the allied success at Verdun.

Had Italy made no protest, and had she allowed the weight of her help to go against the Allies, by attacking the French in the rear, she would have assured a victory to the Central Powers in a very short time.

This was Italy's first help to the Allies, not only an

unselfish act, but one of great courage and daring, which earned for her the bitterest hate from the two countries she had denounced.

As to the moment chosen for openly declaring her allegiance to the allied cause, it must be remembered that Italy had only recently emerged from a long and exhausting war, which had left her depleted in every department of her army, yet, notwithstanding this, she managed to reorganize and replenish her forces in the incredibly short time of a few months, and in spite of the fact that she was even then not ready, she declared war against Austria at a moment when Russia was suffering a succession of defeats, thereby creating a diversion of troops which greatly relieved a strain growing in intensity. Her declaration of war upon Germany, which followed later, had the same beneficial result on the French front.

These are simple incontrovertible facts, and recapitulation brings out two salient points—Italy, by refusing to take part in the unprincipled acts of aggression of Germany and Austria, made her first stand in favor of the Allies. By her open denunciation of these acts, and her entry into the war at the moment chosen, she created diversions which contributed very largely to allied successes.

These facts have been overlooked—or never understood—but they constitute the strongest claim for sympathy and help from those whose cause she was fearless enough to espouse, and for which act she had paid in a disaster directly conceived and planned as vindictive revenge by her former allies.

But there are always two sides to a medal—that which bears the imprint of the tragic disaster of October 23 is graven in lower relief than that which depicts the uprising of an awakened spirit which followed almost immediately after the first effect of the blow. Until this disaster came, Italy was not united in her interpretation of the words "National Honor." The majority of the people were satisfied with the successful efforts of their army

to reclaim the long lost territory of the Trentino. The army, valiant as it was, had not been thoroughly tested. The record was practically one continuous advance against *an enemy hard pushed*—Austria was fast approaching the moment when she would be powerless to offer any serious resistance to the oncoming wave of Italians across the Bainsizza plains. It was almost in Italy's power to force a peace with Austria. Trieste was in sight with all that its conquest meant for the allied fleets, and the destruction of the enemy's largest submarine base—when the Russian defection from the allied cause made possible the help that Austria had been entreating from Germany.

The result of that help we all know. The magnitude of it, and the price exacted by Germany from her ally are known only to a few even in Italy. The maximum has been quoted here as nine divisions. There were seventy-two German divisions, roughly speaking about a million men, without counting the Austrians, Turks and Bulgarians—a concentration of force far exceeding that which has hitherto been employed on any one front. Even this force would have been powerless to overcome the defenses all along the mountain crests, had it not been for the treachery of the few, who, coerced by smooth promises of a speedy peace if they would lay down their arms and refuse to fight, enabled the Germans to enter one of the narrow passes, cut the telephone communications, and take 200,000 prisoners in three hours. This peace propaganda was disseminated largely by the clericals and the unruly section of the socialists, who dwelt upon the certainty of obtaining peace if only the soldiers would refuse to fight, keeping carefully clear of the fact that the reward for this inaction would be a bullet in the back, or starvation in a prisoners' camp behind the German lines.

Many of the men who had succumbed to the pernicious influence of the insidious propaganda, fought to the death when they realized the awful disaster, sacrificing themselves in the vain effort to check the intruding hordes—

but it was too late—a dark night—heavy mists—a new and more deadly type of poison gas—no telephone communications—and the open door of the pass—these combined to create a panic, and many Italians were shot by their own men.

After the first ghastly shock had subsided, the superhuman courage and determination with which the remnants of the poor second army sacrificed themselves almost to a man to allow the retreat from the Bainsizza plains of the whole of the third and fourth army, stands out as a brilliant page in the history of the war. The Bersaglieri and the Alpini are immortalized.

It was known from the first moment of the retreat that the line of the Tagliamento could not be held as permanent defense—but a temporary stand there acted as a check to the onrush of the hordes who had never, never expected the success which fate had allowed them. Even luck was with them, for when the Italians reached the Tagliamento it was in flood; when the Germans arrived it was dry, and they were able to walk across! It was the same with the Piave, with this difference, that although almost dry when the Germans arrived, they did not get across. The line was held, and *will be held*—even in those early days they said, “If we can hold the Piave for a week we can hold it for a year.”

What depended on the holding of that line was realized by only a few. The Germans, drunk with the success of their intrigues, were loudly proclaiming that they would be in Milan in a week. The faint-hearted and the pessimists took up the refrain, and the first week was fought with terror. Only two days before the disaster, Cadorna had cabled to Rome: “Our defenses are impregnable; we are ready for the attack.” On the actual day of the tragedy no bulletin came through, but private telegrams had spread the news; and the day after, a short bulletin came from Cadorna announcing that the line had been broken; that it was the fault of his soldiers who had not held firm. Many, who up till this moment had been his

strong upholders, judged him for the fatal mistake of putting the blame on his soldiers for what he, as general-in-chief, should have foreseen and forestalled.

It was also part of the disaster that General Cadorna had made a bitter enemy of General Capello, commander of the second army, and unfortunately only one of the many antagonistic leaders who had suffered from his overbearing authority. The fact also of his being extremely bigoted in his religious views was unfortunate, considering the vigilance needed to counteract the peace propaganda emanating from the Vatican.

Two, three, four days passed with laconic telegrams from Cadorna, supplemented by the arrival of trainloads of refugees from Udine in pitiable condition, rich and poor alike having been forced to fly at a moment's notice, bringing tales of horror and suffering. A fund was started in Rome which in five days reached 900,000 lire. This from Rome alone! Other funds in Milan and Genoa reached much higher figures, and all this with literally no outside help—just from the Italians themselves. All houses opened their doors freely to the refugees many of whom refused to accept money, saying they were able and willing to work immediately. There were many cases where the coachmen of the public cabs who conveyed the refugees from the station to the houses ready to receive them, refused to take any fare, offering it as their contribution to the general fund for relief.

After the first shock of the news had passed, a reaction of determined resistance set in, led by a group of old Garibaldians far beyond their most advanced limit who demanded permission to go to the front, which was accorded. Companies of mutilated soldiers insisted on returning, and were accompanied to the different stations by cheering crowds. All officers away on leave came back without a moment's delay. Italy, though torn with anguish and shame, was rising to the call of her real spirit—waking to the dawn of a clearer understanding of the sacrifices demanded of her. At first, despair was the

keynote—many said that never again could an Italian hold up his head before the world. To have spent two years in regaining the long lost Trentino—to have spilt the blood of her finest sons only, to lose it all in a week! In that moment of despair it seemed impossible to them ever again to vindicate the national honor.

It seemed no comfort to be reminded of the stupendous blunders of Italy's more powerful allies. Yet did anyone now regard the disaster of the Dardanelles as anything but a foolish mistake? Did anyone now speak of the acts of treachery which had been by no means infrequent both on the English and French fronts?

And was this misguided act of a comparatively small number of soldiers to be compared to the wholesale treachery and intrigue recently exposed by the fearless determination of the present French government, and which existed under the Caillaux regime?

Tragic as these things have been at the time, they were but incidents in the great struggle, incidents that have been dimmed by many an heroic deed of individual and national expiation.

The first interminable week of the Italian retreat ended to find them making a determined stand at the Piave, although in those early days it was thought not improbable that it might have to be withdrawn to the Adige, even to the Mincio. Germany had counted on that and expected to be in Milan in a week. The Italian Chamber was to open on November 10, and quite regardless of the feelings of her ally, Austria, Germany had planned a master stroke.

Reckoning on her arrival in Milan before the opening of the Italian Chamber, she was preparing the most subtle bait for the Italian people. It was to take the form of a proclamation notifying her readiness to cede to Italy the whole of the Trentino with Trieste—in return for a separate peace—and had this dream ever been realized, Italy would have faced the danger of a revolution had she refused to accept terms which to the ignorant majority would have seemed the logical conclusion of the war.

But as usual, Germany miscalculated—she did not reach Milan; she was held at the Piave—met by Italians with an awakened understanding of their true enemy—met by the fusion of individual resistance and determination into a throbbing national solidarity.

The conditions which Germany intended to offer to Italy at the expense of her ally can never be exacted, for they presupposed conquest and non-resistance as usual, but the line of the Piave held—and will hold. The morale of the troops has returned. The spirit of the best impregnated the whole, and was expressed in the words of one of the officers, who said: "They may drive us back to Rome and from Rome to Sicily and from there to Tripoli, but we will never make a separate peace"—almost these same words were repeated by the Hon. Orlando in the Chamber on December 26.

The subtlety of the means employed to sow the seeds of defection among the troops was proved by the discovery that facsimile copies of three leading journals—the *Corriere della Sera*, the *Giornale d'Italia*, and the *Mattino* of Naples—had been secretly printed, apparently exactly the same as the real journals, but small paragraphs had been inserted telling of revolutionary outbreaks in Milan, Alessandria, Naples, and Palermo, in the hope of encouraging discontent among the troops. Still more typical was the discovery that owing to the generous freedom allowed to Austrian prisoners in Sardinia, they had been able to find out an immense number of names of the men at the front to whom they sent anonymous post-cards with the poisonous news that their wives had been unfaithful—sure means of breaking a soldier's spirit. But the days passed—it is now eight weeks that the Piave has held held by spirit alone—for from a military point of view it was thought untenable.

The Italian soldiers have awakened once more to a belief in themselves, have risen to the heights of divine sacrifice, lifted by the spirit of unity which has been born of the tragic disaster. A wave of returning con-

fidence passed over the whole country like wind before the dawn.

No one who was not in Italy during those first three weeks after the events of October 23 can realize how strong was this wave which came from the depths of the national spirit shaken with grief and shame.

Italy is young as a nation, disaster came like a thunderbolt from the clear sky of successful achievement—the most dangerous moment—but it has enabled her to prove her true spirit, heroic and undaunted, it is the “quarto risorgimento.”

ITALY AND THE WAR*

BY GENERAL EMILIO GUGLIELMOTTI

Military Attaché to the Italian Embassy

Ever since the outbreak of the European war, Italy, mother of civilization and law, classic land of all liberty, has felt that her place could not be on the side of autocracy and barbarism. Bound to the Central Powers by reasons vital to her existence and security, and particularly by an unjust and dangerous boundary line imposed upon her in 1866 by her ancient enemy, Austria, Italy had concluded a purely defensive treaty of alliance, which she at once perceived should, *ipso jure et facto*, be considered null and void on the day in which the two major allies, without even consulting her, provoked a war of aggression, of conquest and of oppression. Italy felt that she should not, for the sake of material advantages offered to her by the Central Powers, join them in crushing France and England to whom she was bound by common ideals. Italy could not, therefore, be content with a pure and simple declaration of neutrality, but was moved by fraternal duty to reassure France, her Latin sister, so that she would have no reason for hesitating to strip her Italian frontier and transfer to the point then menaced by the Huns, the troops removed from the Alps; troops which made possible the glorious victory of the Marne.

When the rapid march of events forced Italy to take up arms for her liberty, for her very existence, for the great common cause of justice and law, it was already established beyond question with which side she should cast her lot. Her traditions, her sentiments, her history designated her course in no uncertain manner. Even though not completely prepared, in May, 1915, with the immediate pur-

*Written for the *Yale Review* on November 20, 1917, and published in the issue of January 16, 1918.

pose of relieving the pressure on the Eastern front, at a moment in which the Central Empires were elated by their successes against the demoralized Russian armies, Italy declared war on Austria; and, in August, 1916, as if to demonstrate to the world her unity of purpose to the Allies, she declared war on Germany.

For two years the Italian armies struggled against the most formidable natural difficulties that the whole theatre of the war presented disposed along a front longer than the Belgian, English and French fronts combined. Yet, in spite of a frontier which exposed them to every peril and gave the enemy every advantage, the Italians won victory after victory against the largest and best part of the Austrian army, advancing slowly but steadily into enemy territory, menacing the very existence of the Dual Monarchy.

This constant and wearing pressure which she found herself unable to resist induced Austria to turn for help to her more powerful accomplice, Germany. The latter, after the Italian offensive of last summer, saw the peril approaching her own threshold across Austria, and realized that, if Austria were defeated, it would be a serious blow at her own existence. She, therefore, granted the humble but insistent demand of her vassal, and, gathering a great part of the contingents which the internal situation of Russia allowed her to take from that front, she launched a strong offensive against Italy with combined German and Austrian troops reinforced by Bulgarians and Turks, making an army of at least sixty divisions.

The Austro-German offensive had a double purpose, political and military.

From the political aspect, Germany was conscious of the great difficulty against which the Italian nation struggled: unprovided with money and insufficiently stocked with coal. Germany counted upon the unrest and exhaustion following a long war, upon the political strife which self interest made her exaggerate and foment, and especially upon the pacifist propaganda which she conducted with

such ability, according to her insidious and treacherous custom, both among the people and in the army, to provoke a revolution in Italy and force the nation to submit to a German peace.

From a military point of view, Germany expected to crush Italy quickly and, made more formidable by such victory, she hoped to concentrate the united strength of Germany and Austria for a blow against France and England. She expected to penetrate to the heart of France by a new route across the plains of the Po and the Maritime Alps and to put France beneath her barbarous yoke before the United States could intervene.

The actual result of this double offensive is already a matter of history.

Politically, the profanation of Italian soil has rallied to one standard all the energies of the nation against the invading Huns. Never as in this moment, in the face of the peril from without, have Italians of every political faith of every class, of every region, felt their brotherhood so intimately, so indissolubly. Gathered around their king, their flag and their government, they have indeed proven to the barbarians that they are first and last Italians. A single cry, the ancient cry expressive of the great passion for national entity, of a high desire for life, for independence, for liberty, has resounded from shore to shore of the peninsula: "Fuori i Barbari."

Speaking from the military standpoint, Italy can today affirm with a good conscience that she has for the third time and with her own blood saved not only her cause, but also the cause of the Entente.

This is not the place to discuss the reasons for the first Italian reverses. We cannot now judge how much was due to the powerful pressure of the enemy forces, the crushing superiority of their artillery, the insidious propaganda of the enemy, the shameful ruse [of enemy officers who wore Italian uniforms and used the language learned from us when they were guests at our universities in time of peace, to throw our ranks into confusion. But everything indicates that the oft-lamented disadvantages

of frontier imposed on Italy forced the hasty retreat of troops not actually engaged to prevent their being flanked and cut off. The retreat thus courageously and quickly determined upon by the supreme command, in spite of regret at abandoning in an instant lands so laboriously conquered in thirty months of sacrifice, suffering and bloodshed, might have been checked at the Tagliamento or Livenza, along the rear lines already prudently prepared for defense. But these lines were stripped of artillery, because the scarcity of guns had forced Italy to bring them all forward to support the first line, and today it is absolutely impossible to hold a defensive position without strong artillery support. The only hope of safety and ultimate recovery was to place between the invading army and the Italian forces the greatest distance with the greatest possible speed. And the Italian soldiers retired to the Piave. Putting aside every consideration of art and sentiment the cold military critic might find that the line chosen which did not even eliminate the handicap of the double front on the North and East had fewer of the requisites for defense and counter-attack than other lines farther in the rear. But Italy felt the high duty which her traditions placed upon her, and a clear vision of the fact that she could not assume before the world the responsibility of abandoning *a priori* without an effort to arrest the barbarian hordes, cities of such historic and artistic value as Verona, Vicenza, Padua and above all, Venice, which would have been victims without doubt of the destructive fury of the invaders. And at the Piave Italy halted the Huns.

The glorious episodes of this retreat are already known, how units without guns left behind to cover the retreat of the main bodies and retard the enemies' progress generously sacrificed themselves to the last man to fulfill their duty to their country; how other units completely surrounded fought to the death, refusing to surrender even in hopeless struggles.

The real index of the morale of the army, the valor of the Italian soldier, the soundness of organization and discipline in the great mass of the troops, is the long, magnifi-

cent, efficient resistance which they made immediately following an unexpected and tragic retreat, rapidly executed under the crushing impetus of the hostile armies. Fighting on the mountain and river fronts, outnumbered perhaps five to one, confronting fresh troops constantly relieved, the Italians unaided for more than a month repulsed every attack.

At first the enemy assaults were launched impetuously and continually in the attempt to break the Italian lines which were not yet consolidated, lines held by units which in the rapid development of events had not time to halt and reorganize. Then, calling reinforcements from the three other fronts, and bringing up the heavy artillery which Italy almost entirely lacked, the Huns tried with new and fierce blows from the North to break through into the plain. But once more the Italian soldiers, suffering heavy losses, but inflicting a terrible toll on the invaders, fighting without cessation night and day, attacking with bayonets and rocks when ammunition was exhausted, repulsed every attack and prevented the enemy penetrating our lines, flinging in their faces the ancient cry of the Alpine warriors, adopted afterward by the French soldiers at Verdun, "Di qui non si passa!"

Soon France and England, realizing the stupendous enemy plan, sent their brave troops to Italy where they were joyously acclaimed by the Italians as the concrete evidence of their brotherhood in arms and the unity of their cause. The Italian troops consented to be relieved by the Allies in some places along the first lines of defense and to take a well-earned rest after having halted alone the Austro-German advance.

Meanwhile the great American republic, which had promptly sent Italy aid in supplies and money, likewise declared war on Austria, thus giving to Italy new proof of her sympathy and to the world new evidence of her desire to defeat the enemies of liberty in every time and place. The common ideals, the just cause, the proven valor of their soldiers will bring sure victory to the nations of the Entente. God is with them!

THE BATTLE FOR VENICE*

BY WALTER LITTLEFIELD

I have been asked to say a few words on the Battle for Venice. By all the laws of logic and strategy I should be talking about the battle for Laibach, possibly for Vienna. For by September 1, Cadorna had shown the way to those battles, just as Napoleon 120 years ago had shown it. But questions of tactics and of politics have, meanwhile, intervened, and so I am constrained to speak about the Battle for Venice.

With Germany's well known propensity for holding her nearest and strongest foes and attacking her most remote and weakest—with Serbia overwhelmed, Rumania crushed, and Russia forced into neutrality with the aid of the Bolsheviks—it was natural that she should turn her attention to Italy, and, taking advantage of the lack of complete cooperation which still prevailed among the Allies—of the insidious conspiracies which were going on among their people for a dishonorable peace—attempt to render *hors de combat* Austria's most redoubtable foe and possibly attain thereby an entrance to the back door of France.

Austria herself had already tried to do this in May and June, 1916, when she made a drive from the Trentino into the Regione di Veneto and reached Asiago on the Sette Comuni. Then, however, flanked from the Val Sugana in the northeast and from the Astico in the southwest, she was hurled back with the loss of between 80,000 and 100,000 men.

But the German attack was different. Austria struck at Italy's weakest front, at her strongest point, hoping thereby to reach Vicenza and the railway system which,

*Address delivered under the auspices of the British War Relief Committee, at "Hero Land," on Italian Day, December 1, 1917.

through Udine, fed the Italian Second and Third Armies on the Isonzo and the Fourth Army guarding the passes through the Carnic Alps. She also hoped to reach Brescia, the industrial and metallurgic center of Italy to the southwest, and force a peace at Rome, having, meanwhile, thrown wide open the back door to France.

What Germany did was this: She struck at the weakest point on Italy's strongest front and then waited to apply the Austrian strategy of the year before.

In his operations last August east of the Isonzo, Cadorna had almost severed the Austrian line along the Ciapovano Valley and had come within 35 miles of Laibach. In the north his line lay across the slopes of Monte Nero, from Plezzo to Tolmino, a distance of $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles, like a string to the bow of the Isonzo which, between these two points, bends westward. In the middle ground his line curved over the Bainsizza Santo Spirito, on a 10-mile front with a penetration of $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles. In the south only the volcanic pile of Hermada blocked the way to Trieste across the Carso.

Obviously, the front was exposed at Plezzo and Tolmino, and on the Bainsizza, from the Idrio on the north and from Monte San Gabriele and Monte San Daniele on the south. Besides, at Tolmino the Italians had never crossed the Isonzo, being prevented by the bridgehead formed just south of the city by Monte Santa Maria and Monte Santa Lucia on the right or western bank.

At these weak points, therefore, Germany struck. Her preparation was, as usual, characteristic. The Italians on the sector across Monte Nero had not been relieved for over a year. These had begun to fraternize with the Austrians. The Pope's peace note of August 1 was made use of. There were forged copies of Italian papers telling of starving women and children in Naples and Genoa who had been fired on by British mercenaries. The Socialist Camorra of Ferri and the Pacificist Camorra of Giolitti also got in their fine work, and, when all was ready, Italian-speaking Bulgarians surprised the telephone stations at the

outposts and said that orders had been received from Udine for a retreat.

The trap was sprung on Sunday, October 21. I do not think that at first the Germans had any expectations of performing the invasion which ultimately resulted. But having secured an initial advantage they pressed it for all it was worth. The Russian situation had permitted the release of forty-seven Teutonic divisions from the Eastern Front. At first six of these were used, then thirteen, then forty in all. At first Germany used the bogey of Mackenzen to frighten the Italians, but von Below was really in command.

Now the Regione di Veneto, north and east, has five natural lines of defense—the right banks of the Tagliamento, of the Livenza, of the Piave, of the Brenta, and of the Adige. The Brenta flows through the Val Sugana in the Trentino; the Adige flows directly through the Trentino. Both the Brenta and the Adige enter the Adriatic south of Venice. A retreat to these lines would mean the loss of the Pearl of the Adriatic.

Well, Germany struck—at Plezzo, at Tolmino, and on the north of the Bainsizza. From Plezzo she entered the valley of the Natizone; behind the Santa Maria and Santa Lucia she crossed the Isonzo and entered the valley of the Judrio; this maneuver practically enveloped the Italian line lying across the slopes of Monte Nero and thousands of Italian prisoners were taken and hundreds of guns captured. Worst of all, however, it exposed the rear of the armies stretching across the Bainsizza and the Carso, and a general retreat was begun—a retreat magnified by daring acts on the part of the Italians who were made to realize the truth of Virgil's line: "*Una salus victis, nullam sperare salutem.*"

Of the Veneto lines of defense, that of the Tagliamento had been fortified in the spring of 1915, just before Italy entered the war; that of the Piave had been later utilized for a terrain of practice trenches. It will be seen that the Second and Third Armies retreating from the Isonzo

could not proceed very far westward before exposing the rear of the Fourth Army in the north.

So the Fourth Army also began to retreat. When it was out of the Val Sugana, Germany revealed the full scope of her strategy. She struck south from the Trentino and occupied Asiago, on the Sette Comuni. But now, unlike the situation in the summer of 1916, Asiago could not be flanked from the Val Sugana. Thus Asiago was on the rear-left of the retreating Fourth, Second, and Third Armies, and on the rear-right of the First Army lying along the Val Terragnola before Rovereto. Similar to the Asiago advance another descended between the Piave and the Brenta as far as the slopes of Monte Grappa. In the east the Germans reached the Piave.

But no further. Here the Italians have raised the cry of the French at Verdun: "On ne passera pas—Da qui non si passa!"

And now, whatever may have been the causes which allowed Von Below to effect an entering wedge and however the retreat of the Italian armies to the Piave may be criticised, one luminous fact stands out as bright as day. It is this: By September 1, Cadorna had demonstrated to the world, as Napoleon had done 120 years before, that the way to defeat Austria was across the Isonzo and through the Julian Alps. And it is a matter of political knowledge that, with Austria defeated and placed in the inevitable chaos of a social revolution, the military power of Germany would collapse.

Why, therefore, was this unequalled condition not taken advantage of by the Allies? Here we are brought face to face with considerations which have never obstructed the German High Command—political considerations. What are these political considerations? I really do not know. Yet I am informed that they exist and that they are very formidable when any attempt is made to have unity and concentration of forces on the part of the Allies. They kept Greece from attacking Turkey when the approaches to Constantinople were defended by a handful of soldiers.

They were responsible for the Gallipoli fiasco, for the Serbian disaster, for the chaos in Russia. They have closed the eyes of military experts and have so far rendered immune the Lorraine sector and the Heligoland naval base. They occasionally permit cooperation, but never unity of strategy, of tactics on the part of the Allies, and that concentration of forces, that coordination of supplies, that one supreme executive which are so necessary to victory, and which have been Germany's from the first.

A better day seemed dawning a fortnight ago when a Triune General Staff was established for the conduct of the war in Italy—with Foch, Wilson, and Cadorna. But nothing came of it. Political considerations intervened. And so today we find the forces of England and of France which have entered Italy busily engaged in fortifying the Adige and the Po so as to protect the back door of France, when they should be on the Piave bearing victory for the Allies through the front door of Italy!

And political considerations will probably keep up until the end of the ineffective battles of attrition in Flanders—the mere gaining of territory which could much better be recovered from a beaten Germany at the end of the war than on the battlefield. And all oblivious are these political considerations to the glaring fact that the battle line from the North Sea to the Adriatic, with vast salients in Lorraine and Veneto, is the interior of a curve; that while it takes Germany more than a week to move troops from Flanders to Veneto the same thing can be accomplished by the Allies within forty-eight hours.

This is a tactical, a topographical truth which needs no demonstration. The corollary needed to make it yield victory for the Allies is very simple. It is this: One front, one army, one supreme command.

THE PROBLEMS OF VICTORY*

BY HON. MEDILL McCORMICK

Representative from Illinois

* * * * *

Then the Imperial Staff struck their adversaries again, this time on the right flank, in Italy. There is no mystery about that blow. In order to understand it we have only accurately to estimate the weakness and the strength of Italy, her achievement, and her failure, and the responsibility which we share with her European allies for her recent defeat. Italy, strong in man power but weak in all other resources, had done well. Some of her troops had been proved the equal of any in the French and British Armies. She had driven the Austro-Hungarian forces slowly eastward in the face of the great natural obstacles. All observers praised the organization with which she maintained her front in an incomparably difficult country. You must bear in mind that Italy labored under great handicaps.

In a war which is primarily industrial, Italy producing no iron and no coal, received from abroad even less than her normal imports. Her shell factories, which should have been working night and day, were working but part time. In spite of her lack of war material she pushed the enemy to the north in the Trentino and forced him eastward on the road which runs past Trieste to Laibach. She was seeking the old Napoleonic route to the heart of the Hapsburg monarchy. Ah! If she had been supplied with the resources to have driven through it! When I was on that front, Trieste was before our eyes. There were but two barriers between us and the highway to the

*Extract from a speech delivered in the House of Representatives, Monday, January 7, 1918.

plains beyond. The sons of the Roman road builders had woven over the rocky and precipitous desert a network of splendid highways the like of which are not to be seen on this continent. Along those highways, for miles, in iron pipes, they carried water for the parched armies and compressed air for the tools to drive galleries, to drill out tunnels, to cut roads across the faces of sheer cliffs. But for lack of ammunition her advance was stopped.

The Austrians were weakening. Italian officers told me of the capture of Turks among the prisoners, Turks summoned by the Imperial German staff to the help of faltering Austria. As Italy pushed painfully toward the eastern edge of the desert country her difficulties increased. Her advance had been stopped because she lacked shells. For want of shells and guns her long flank on the north was weak. When I was there Hungarian divisions of real worth, together with German guns and German divisions from the Russian front, were being assembled for the drive which the Italians even then anticipated. They knew that they were in danger.

Sir, people were troubled by our course. They asked why we had joined hands with France and Britain and not with them, whose ideals and purposes were the same as those of the other western democracies. They asked why we had differentiated between the modern Hohenzollern autocracy and the more ancient, more obscurantist, more reactionary, and more tyrannical Hapsburg.

Italy expected the attack, but she did not look for the cowardice and treason of some of her divisions, which had been corrupted by the imperial spy system developed—in Italy as in America—while Italy stood by and watched the other democracies fight. They threw down their guns, those divisions, and Italy with her line broken had to fall back to the Piave.

There is a little satisfaction to be gained from the knowledge that the imperial staff achieved no great strategic success in Italy when they drove their enemies back to the line of the Piave. They made a political foray primarily

for its moral effect and to relieve the pressure in the main theater of the war. Both these results they accomplished. They cured Austria-Hungary of despair. They marched Italian prisoners through the streets of Berlin and restored the faltering faith of the German people in the invincibility of the Hohenzollern. They compelled the British and French to detach divisions and guns from the western line, where they were gaining, to assist the Italians in the plain of the Po.

If America and the Allies can profit by the lesson, we may yet count the German drive into Italy as a disguised blessing. Every thinking creature can now see, what too few saw before, that the front from the Adriatic to the channel is a common front. [Applause.] It is 700 miles long. Three hundred miles of it lie between the Alps and the Adriatic; 400 miles between the channel and the Alps.

There are about seven Italians under arms for every ten men in the combined French and British armies in France and Flanders, so that the number of men is about equally proportioned to the lengths of the two great sections of the western line, but there is a great disparity in the distribution of guns. Even before the Italians lost a third or so of their cannon, the enemy on the Italian front faced less than one-quarter as many guns as he faced in the hands of the British and the French.

If America and the Allies can learn anything from the past, if America awakens and does her full duty in the manufacture of vast numbers of cannon, Italy with her millions of infantry can be armed by us with the great weapons necessary to repeat on the Piave what transpired on the Marne. [Applause.]

When the drive into Italy was checked, for simple and cogent reasons, the Imperial Staff turned from Italy to France.

ITALY AND THE REAL VILLAIN*

BY WILL IRWIN

I begin this on a day when the Italians are fighting along the line of the Piave River, trying to hold back the Austrians from the immortal stones of Venice, when the western passes into the imperiled land are filled with French and British troops hurrying to what may be a decisive battle in Armageddon. The disaster that fell on the fine, able Italian Army is now more than three weeks old. Entente Europe has recovered from its first shock and is beginning already to see a way out. At first, to us who watched the preliminary stages of the great Austrian drive, who saw the fugitives begin to stream down the Venetian Plain, and who witnessed for a fortnight the sorrow of Rome, it seemed an irrevocable tragedy. It was a tragedy, at best; though now we know it was not irrevocable. A right understanding of that tragedy is a lesson, a most pertinent and useful lesson, to us Americans in our present relation toward this war. For that reason I set about telling as much as I know and can publish with honor about the events of the past few months in Italy.

I cannot, however, give true point to the story without going back and dragging the reader through a few paragraphs of history and social philosophy; for Italy, like all the other European countries, finds her present linked irrevocably with her past. Young and fluid as we are, we can often, in crises like this, divorce ourselves in a day from our past with all its customs and traditions. They on the other side of the water cannot do that; and the link with their past is sometimes a great strength with them, and sometimes, also, a great weakness.

*Reprinted from the *Saturday Evening Post*. Copyright, 1918, by The Curtis Publishing Company.

Italy, then, of all the powers engaged in this war, is the oldest people but the youngest nation. Her tradition of high civilization runs back through twenty-five centuries. Her corporate existence as a nation was broken, between the dying years of the Roman Eastern Empire and the movement for United Italy, by a thousand years of disruption. The race, during that period, remained intact in blood and virtually in speech. But politically the nation was broken up into a series of cities; some, like Venice and Florence, carving out for a time little principalities of their own in the surrounding territory; some never pretending to any domain outside the city walls and the surrounding fields. Her history during those thousand years is written in terms not of a people but of municipalities. One thing alone survived—the unconquerable spirit of a race that breaks more commonly into genius than any other we know.

THE BEGINNINGS OF UNITED ITALY

The forlorn hope of a United Italy, of a strong people welded and self-governing, took form in the middle of the nineteenth century; and action began when Garibaldi, with his band of wild revolutionaries, captured and lost Rome in 1848. That was a noble failure—the Bunker Hill of United Italy. For ten years more the north was divided between the loyalist Italian House of Savoy and Austrian tyranny, the center was held by the Papal States, and the south festered under King Bomba's Kingdom of the Two Sicilies—probably the most incompetent government of modern times. Garibaldi, the Liberator, came back in 1859, with his thousand, and performed the miracle of taking Sicily—a thousand troops, armed with condemned muskets, against thirty thousand regulars! Miracle followed miracle, so that historians are still puzzled to account for subsequent events. Most of them, indeed, beg the question, and lay it to luck, forgetting the unbeatable combination of four men with genius—Garibaldi, the wild Liberator; Cavour, the subtle

statesman; Mazzini, the persuasive agitator; and Victor Emmanuel, the strong king. At any rate, within the year United Italy was formed—after a fashion.

The Papal States, however, still held much of the center, and Austria much of the north, including Venice. In 1866 Germany fought Austria; and Italy, with the hope of getting her own, combined with Germany against her hereditary foe. Garibaldi almost had his hands on Trento, last Italian outpost city in the mountains, and Cadorna, the elder, was about to take Trieste, when Germany, having quickly beaten Austria, withdrew her support and left Italy stranded. As a sop, Bismarck gave her part of the northern provinces held by Austria; and in the subsequent settlement she took over Venice.

United Italy waited four years more. In 1870 Germany and France went to war. Taking advantage of the situation, Italy seized the Papal States, which had been protected by Napoleon III of France. Her boundaries came to be as we know them in the school geographies and United Italy was a reality. Not until then could she be considered a nation; for the period between 1860 and 1870 was so full of wars, rumors of wars, diplomacies and perils that no time was left for the real work of welding and organizing. She had, then, when Armageddon broke, only forty-four years of true national existence.

Now, she had begun with nothing—no armies or navies or finances or developed resources—nothing but the will to be a free and united people. In her vicinity, and vitally interested in her affairs, as the rattlesnake is interested in the gambols of a bird, were three reactionary nations who had all these necessities of empire—the monarchial France of Napoleon III, Austria, and the Prussia that was becoming greater Germany. In her foreign policy, conducted by a series of most able and subtle ministers, she could afford only one steady objective—to hold herself together and keep her own, without war if possible; for she could not afford another war.

She had special problems, unknown to the youth of such a nation as ours. One was what the Italians call *campanalism*—the town spirit as opposed to the national spirit. "In the beginning," an acute observer of Italian life said to me, "we were not like a piece of welded metal, as a nation should be. We were like marbles in a box."

HAPSBURG TYRANNY

Again, there was the problem of the Clerical Party—a large body of voters, including a most able element, refusing, for conscience's sake, to participate in the affairs of the nation. With her one ideal of national unity and national existence before her, she must take from the international situation simply what she could get, while she welded and built toward internal strength.

All this explains why Italy found herself, in the course of a few years, bound in an alliance with a nation against which a great part of her people held an old grudge, a nation whose scheme of government she despised, whose rule she had hated—Austria.

We Americans have been so busy with the crimes and shortcomings of Germany that we have paid little attention to Austria. As a matter of fact, if Germany is now the main villain of the European tragedy it is because of superior ability, not of worse intentions. The patchwork kingdom has just emerged from the barbaric stage of open and professed absolutism. Under the German leadership, established since 1866, the Austrians have become good administrators, as they were not when they held dominion over Northern Italy; but they are and always have been political tyrants toward the stranger peoples whom they are warping into their system.

Old imperial Russia herself has no such record of political executions—"The Hangman" was the Italian nickname for Francis Joseph. One governor of an Italian district in the *Irredenta* had on his record two thousand hangings on charges of political conspiracy. In the early part of the nineteenth century, when they were trying to

reconcile the Venetian province to their system, they supplemented the rope with the scourge. Whipping to death was very common. Half a century is a short time in the European memory; and all Northern Italy remembers those days with intense hatred.

The Hapsburg dynasty is, if anything, more reactionary than the Hohenzollern—hard, narrow, sure of its belief in the divine right of kings and of all other things reactionary. The parliament is regarded by the throne and its supporters as a mere concession to keep the people quiet. And at one side sits the army, a force sinister and powerful. The Austrian corps of officers is a kind of Pretorian Guard in organization and feeling—loyal only to itself and the emperor's person; wholly out of sympathy with the life of the people.

Discipline in the Austrian Army was always brutal and barbaric; the officers justified it on the ground that they had many races to control and must stamp out the faintest sparks of disloyalty. This whole army outlook on life, politics and war is summed up in a conversation reported to me by an Italian friend, who was once a teacher in an Austrian university. He and an officer fell to debating on politics and the future of the Eastern European world.

"We'll have to fight you some day," said the Austrian; "there's no one else to fight! We can't fight Germany—the alliance is too close. We can't fight Russia—alone. There's no one left but you."

"Why fight at all?" asked the Italian, quite naturally. "Oh, but we must fight now and then!" replied the Austrian. "You see, in peace parliaments and democracy and all that hog foolishness get a foothold. We have to allow the people their sport. When that goes far enough we have a war and get our grip again, and things go as they should!"

Such was and such is the troublesome and hated northern neighbor of Italy. More than a border, and the resentments engendered by a border, divided them—the

whole, irreconcilable difference between the autocratic spirit in which Austria still gloried, and the democratic spirit in which United Italy was born and nurtured.

Bismarck it was who, in the final settlement of 1870, set the boundary between Austria and Italy. He was the evil genius of the nineteenth century—this Bismarck; the world, including his own Germany, is paying now for his wickedness. But he thought far, far ahead. In the defeat of Austria he saw a chance not only for a united German Empire but also for a powerful, permanent and always subservient ally.

To that end he did not, as he might have done, add all the German districts of Austria to the new empire. He left in Austria a strong nucleus of German-speaking people, in the expectation that they would come to govern the patchwork empire, and govern it in harmony with German plans. In that expectation he was not disappointed. Though Hungary has proved rebellious and dangerous in later years, Germanic Austria has retained its grip; in the pinch of Armageddon it has bent the whole empire to the dominant will of Imperial Germany.

THE CRAFT OF BISMARCK

Such being his policy, Bismarck did all he could to strengthen Austria against foes from without, and especially against the new, rising Italy. With that end in view he drew the frontier of 1866-70; and drew it in such a manner, we know now, as to insure future trouble.

Between the hereditary home of the Italian people and that of the Austrian peoples runs the barrier of the Alps—all the way, virtually, from Switzerland to the Adriatic. For five-sixths of the distance these great mountains form a tangle of peaks, range parallel to range, like that bulge in the Rockies which one notes on the maps of Colorado. For the rest of the distance the Alps run down into foothills, ending with the stony, bald and broad hill desert of the Carso—a position almost as valuable, for defensive purposes, as any mountain range.

Now a really just boundary, insuring military protection to both sides of the frontier, would have run through the middle of the Alpine mountain tangle and the Carso desert. It happened, also, that this was in still another way the just boundary; the natural flux and reflux of races had arranged that matter long before. For northward, up to that imaginary boundary, ran a population exactly as Italian, in blood, speech, tradition—everything—as the peoples of Lombardy or the Venetian plain. Trento, in the mountains, held herself as Latin, in every sentiment and feeling, as Verona, on the other side of the mountains; no less than Venice herself did Gorizia, in the oasis of the Carso, feel herself a part of the old Venetian Republic.

But Italy, in the scheme of Bismarck, must have no military parity with the future vassal state of Austria. He drew the boundary across the southern edge of the mountain tangle. Here and there, as the crazy line wriggled along the Alps, it granted the Italians the favor of one thin screen of peaks—faced always on the north with rank after rank of superior heights.

The valuable passes all went to Austria. As the line emerged into the lower country, toward the Adriatic, it deviated from the mountain line onto the plain. The foothills of the Alps, the desert of the Carso, the deep and easily defensible Isonzo, were all Austrian.

“There are many doors to Italy,” said an Italian officer to me last year, “and Austria holds the key to them all. If we wish to enter we must use a battering-ram.”

So this situation remained for forty-four years, during which Italy passed from resentment to a kind of forced toleration. The problem of Italia Irredenta—Unredeemed Italy—troubled the Italians less, perhaps, than the question of Alsace-Lorraine troubled France. For Alsace and Lorraine were kidnaped from the motherland within the memory of man, while these lost provinces of Italy, though hers by right, had not been hers in deed for

a thousand years. She had performed such miracles of recovery in her glorious burst of the nineteenth century. She had so much to do internally that this problem could afford to wait.

Also, it seemed for a time that the Irredenta problem had reached a half solution. A dawn of liberalism had begun, it appeared, in Austria. Nominal parliamentary government had been granted; freedom to use their own tongue, to live without discrimination in their own way, had been accorded the Italians of Southern Austria. An Irredentist party, pressing the claims of their enslaved brethren, still existed in Italy; but it formed a small minority.

So, following her policy of playing any and every game that would grant her security for internal development, Italy, within fifteen years after her birth as a nation, had formed an alliance with Austria. As Count Neri said, Italy and Austria had to be either enemies or allies. And this measure, it was felt, afforded still more security to Italia Irredenta. Surely Austria, who valued this alliance for her own ends, would not persecute the blood brothers of her allies as she was persecuting the Czechs and other subject races who had none to take their part! Austria nursed this illusion by granting still more freedom to her Italian subjects. Just as lightly did Italy enter the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria. Indeed, this move had at the time the general approval of Europe. It created and maintained the balance of power, that impermanent foundation on which the armed camp of Europe managed to keep the peace for thirty years or more.

GERMAN MONEY IN ITALY

And Germany, bound to Italy by the Triple Alliance, proved for a long time of real value to the rising little kingdom with her great internal tasks. German methods and German machinery helped in the great industrial renaissance at the north, which has placed Milan, Turin

and Brescia among the most efficient manufacturing communities in Europe.

Early in the game Germany introduced, through the Banca Commerciale and other houses, her advanced system of banking, whereby the bank becomes a partner with the man who needs money to develop his business. In a thousand branches of business she made Italy a profitable customer. Hotel keeping is a mightily important asset to Italy, whose old monuments and works of art form a great commercial asset.

Everywhere the Germans wormed themselves into the hotel business, introducing modern methods that drew wealth into the country.

There was no historic quarrel between Germany and Italy, as there was between Austria and Italy—even if Bismarck did juggle that frontier. Since United Italy became a dream, the two nations had never been at war. Toward Austria there had always been hatred of the bitterest variety, especially in the north. France had been an open enemy many times. Napoleon I rent the country apart and divided it between his relatives and his marshals.

Napoleon III, even though he was their friend for a few months in 1859–60, had taken Rome from Garibaldi in 1848; his armed protection kept the new kingdom from occupying the Roman provinces between 1860 and 1870.

The average Italian perhaps failed to understand that France was a different Power since she founded the Third Republic in 1870; Armageddon had been going for a year before most Europeans separated the sheep from the goats, realizing which nations had gone over the democratic ridge and which lingered in the shadows on the wrong side of the hill. But Germany had always seemed a friend. Hardly anyone in Italy, outside the well-informed diplomatic circles, perceived that she was the real villain of the drama, the prologue of which was being played even then; that Austria was to figure as the cat's-paw.

Then Armageddon broke. The Triple Alliance provided that every member of the agreement should support the others in case they were attacked. Now the Germans have slapped much camouflage over the causes of this war. But everyone in every European chancellery knew that Germany had been waiting and working, during several years, for a general assault on the liberties of this world, and that this was the moment. The Italians, who, under the Triple Alliance, had been watching their neighbor's game from the inside, knew it best of all. The German cry "We are attacked!" simply brought grim laughter from the Quirinal.

An anxious week passed, however, before the government, responsible, as in all democracies, to the people, felt sure that it might be allowed to act on its own instincts and its own plans. The people spoke decisively. Liège had not fallen before the Socialists passed resolutions declaring that they would never consent to an attack on France. Privately or publicly, nearly every other organized force of public opinion spoke to the same effect.

The government conveyed assurances to Paris that Italy would remain neutral. This enabled France to draw a whole army away from the Italian border and to win the battle of the Marne with it. Really the Germans, who knew exactly what they were doing and knew that Italy knew, never expected support from the junior member of the Alliance; but this prompt reassurance to France, with its decisive effect, was a disagreeable surprise. Then Italy sat still—and thought.

Long before Armageddon, friction had been growing with that enemy ally, Austria. Whether by policy or by virtue of a passion for political tyranny impossible of long suppression, she was breaking her tacit pledges toward the Italians of the Irredenta. The noose and the whip had been brought out of the museums and were at work again.

The really decisive moment, the true occasion, in the

opinion of many minds for the present war, occurred in 1905. As a concession to her ally, Austria had consented to the creation of an Italian-language university in the Irredenta. Suddenly she suppressed it utterly; and gradually she began a process of forced Germanization. The sparks of nationality had been burning low in the Trentino and Trieste. This blew them up into a sullen, smoldering flame. The Italians of the north said among themselves that, at the first opportunity, they must have a third war of liberation to get back their own.

SYMPATHY WITH FRANCE

Still, I think, Italy would never have gone to war for the Irredenta alone, any more than France would have gone to war for Alsace-Lorraine alone. An old, old people, the Italians are very complex; they do nothing for simple causes. First, there was the Belgian outrage and the gradual perception that this was a war of democracy. Then there was a feeling for England, whose diplomacy and whose volunteers had helped so much in the creation of United Italy. Finally, there was France. "And," says one of my Italian friends, "no one on this peninsula is indifferent to France. Some may dislike her and some like her; but none is indifferent."

One element especially liked France—the intellectuals. Between French thought and Italian thought, in art, science, philosophy and government, there has always existed a burning sympathy. True, in the Germanization of parts of Italy, German thought had taken a hold on some of the universities. The Italian intellectual resented that. "Teaching Dante by rule of thumb, *per Bacco!*" said one of this class to me before the war began. "Four years spent in reconstructing texts and not five minutes in contemplating his beauties!" So most of the Italians felt; the diamond-hard, diamond-bright thought of France was their birthright as Latins, not the pretentious, posing and unilluminated thought of Germany.

It was these intellectuals who made United Italy in

the beginning. In Garibaldi's immortal thousand, who took Sicily and lighted the torch, there was scarcely one peasant; there were few men of affairs or of business. They were poets, painters, village attorneys, schoolmasters, university students—even clergymen. The intellectuals rose again. D'Annunzio, with that enormous prestige a poet has in Latin countries, took the stump. Cesare Battisti—afterward caught and hanged for treason by the Austrians—came down from Trieste and urged the claims of Unredeemed Italy. The Garibaldis, grandsons of the great Liberator, heritors of a name like that of Washington with us, threw in their powerful sentimental influence on the side of intervention.

These intellectuals, the true cause of Italy's war, joined hands with a small party against which, in other times, they might have fought most ardently. This was the Nationalist, founded at the time of the Tripolitan War, with the idea of a Greater Italy. The aristocracy, generally held back; all aristocracies in neutral Europe incline a little to the Central Powers. But, except in minor centers, the aristocracy is aside from the current of Italian life.

GIOLITTI AND HIS PARTY

The main opposition, indeed—and an honorable one enough—lay in the political powers that were. For a long, long time, Giolitti had been the strong politician of Italy. Three times premier by general election of the people, he remained between terms the quiet power—a kind of Latin Mark Hanna. We shall never understand the affairs of the purely Latin countries if we imagine that their legislative bodies, like ours, are divided into a real party system. Parties there are, but usually impermanent ones. The true line-up is a matter of personal following.

Giolitti had the strongest following in Italy. In all fairness it is no discredit to Giolitti that his connections were strongly German. After all, Germany was the

head of the Alliance by which Italy had kept peace for thirty years; to many Italians who hated Austria she seemed a benevolent big sister, her hands full of gifts. Giolitti was against intervention. He pointed out, in a pronouncement which maddened the interventionists, that Italy could get nearly as much by trading with Austria on her neutrality as she could by entering the war.

All over Italy the interventionists rose and began to riot. Salandra, the premier, who occupied office in the beginning by sufferance of Giolitti, and Sonnino, the able minister for foreign affairs, had already gone over to the war party. The time for the decision in the Chamber of Deputies approached, and the students raged through Rome calling for the new war of liberation. To the last moment, I am told, the German ambassador sat back happy and contented, sure of a favorable vote. But the popular enthusiasm swept the deputies into the war party, and Italy solemnly ranged herself with the forces of democracy. Out of affairs for the time, Giolitti returned to Turin.

It was a complex affair, even more complex than I have here conveyed; but the mainspring of the Italian uprising was the burning desire for freedom, the sympathy with democracy, inherited by Italy from Garibaldi, from Mazzini, from Cavour, from all her giants of the fighting sixties. Only secondary was the desire to rescue her brothers of the Irredenta and, in rescuing them, to close the doors that menaced Italy.

We think of the Latin nature as suspicious; and in so thinking we only half-judge it. Suspicious on one side of his mind the real Latin is; on another he is as trusting as a child. For he is, above all, human, and has human tolerances and allowances for the failings or misfortunes of other people. So, with their eyes on their old major enemy, Austria, they went on neglecting to watch the real villain of the piece. Though they broke diplomatic relations with Germany, it was a year before they declared war. In that period most of the transplanted

Germans went about their affairs, only carelessly watched. Even after the declaration of war with Germany, the measures of repression were neither stern enough nor thorough enough.

Further, small elements—if not actually disloyal, at least hostile to the war—continued to flourish. On one side were certain members of the Clerical parties, always at outs—owing to the old seizure of the Papal States—with United Italy. On the other extreme—and here extremes met—were the majority Socialists—the official party. The dissenting Socialist groups had indorsed the war. These majority Socialists have only a block of forty or fifty votes in a chamber of five hundred members. They are, however, able parliamentarians, and cohesive—the only group, really, in the Italian Parliament that holds caucuses and can be depended upon to vote *en bloc*.

As the war goes on and Socialism fails as a party, though it succeeds as a principle, one begins to perceive two main currents of Socialist thought, which I may call the doctrinaire and the liberal. Socialism, in the beginning, was a great democratic movement toward human freedom, in thorough sympathy with such uprisings for political liberty as the successful American, French and Italian revolutions, and the abortive German revolution of 1848.

In Germany, its birthplace, the gradual corruption of a once admirable race has largely turned it into a machine doctrine of economics; the original object, which was wider human liberty and the greatest good to the greatest number, has become lost in the machinery. The system—whatever its results—is the end of the majority German Socialist. From the beginning of the war we have seen German Socialism used by the oppressors of Germany as a tool against the corresponding class in enemy and neutral countries. It is being so used at this moment in our own country. I, who say this, profess myself a Socialist in theory. On the other hand, the liberal Socialism of France and Germany looks beyond the machine to its great object of wider human happiness.

Unfortunately the Socialism of Italy, at least in the majority party, had risen and flourished under German tutelage, and held the machine more dear than the product. Especially these Italian majority Socialists adhered to the narrower tenet of internationalism with peace—the doctrine their German tutors had rejected on the first day of the great war.

The German Socialist majority has made its admirers and associates in enemy countries dance to the time of a very tragic comedy during the past two years. Repudiating, themselves, any idea of peace save a triumphant German peace, they have at the same time cajoled their dupes into struggling for peace in the abstract at the very moments when peace would most advantage autocratic Germany.

THE ADVANCE ON THE CARSO

Let me merely sketch the events of the next two years: The Italian Army proved so good as to astonish even its admirers. One by one it got the keys of the main doors to Italy. In a series of movements, notable alike for valor and for clever strategy, the Italians forced their way to the Carso and the lower Alps, and, in eleven desperate and ever-victorious battles, battered across them. The fine attack of last August gave them the Bainsizza Plateau and the important height of Monto Santo. Only one great barrier remained—Monte San Gabriele. Take that and the Italians would have an open road to Laibach and eventually to Vienna.

In spite of a few cabinet changes, the country behind the army held with all necessary firmness. Through the energy and capacity of her able northern engineers Italy made up for her shortage of coal and turned out the munitions. Like all the other Western Allies, she bungled the food problem in the beginning. In 1916, owing to a too-low maximum price, the acreage planted in winter wheat was comparatively small. On top of that came a bad, dry year. She found herself in food difficulties,

though not insuperable ones. On the whole, prospects last summer seemed rosy. There were those who believed that we should have our decision on the Austrian-Italian Front.

Now let us turn to Germany: Her diplomats, last summer, spent half of their energy in getting a firm grip on the Austrians, who, weary of the war, were trying their best to wriggle out. From the beginning of the war the Germans recognized, as the prouder and less practical Allied nations did not, the value of propaganda for persuading the neutrals and for weakening enemies. That propaganda, as we all know, was very awkward in the beginning; it tried to attack the Anglo-Saxon and Latin mind by the methods effective with the peculiar German mind.

In the first three or four months of the war every time he opened his mouth the servile German savant, mobilized to persuade the inferior peoples, gave something away or merely raised a laugh. But the Germans, with their cool adaptation of the means to the end, changed their tune. I imagine that, just as they mobilized their expert chemists to make poison gases to destroy the body, they mobilized, also, their advertising experts, their psychologists, their best journalists, perhaps even their novelists and dramatists, to make noxious vapors against the mind. For their propaganda, as time went on, grew amazingly clever in its adaptation to circumstances and to the various kinds of minds at which it was directed.

There is one propaganda for Spain; in America such a campaign would fall flat, but it exactly suits the peculiar Spanish psychology; there is another for Switzerland; and there is still another for America. But various as the methods are, I have felt all this year, as I studied the German camouflage in the European countries, a sense of general strategic plan under one clever head or group of heads. Everywhere, for example, they have been trying to instill the idea of peace: "It is coming; it is inevitable; to fight longer is foolish for all sides; the Germans desire it as much as anyone else."

THE PAN-GERMANIST'S GOD

I thought, last summer, that this was because Germany wanted to settle up the war before she found herself in a deeper hole. I am not so sure now but that it was part of a general plan to weaken the Allies by implanting so strongly the hope of peace as to relax the spirit and resistance of peoples.

Germany's generation of steady preparation for her burst toward empire had given her exceptional machinery to get at the minds of her enemies. She had an increasing people. It was a cardinal principle of the autocrats who were steering her destinies to make the German people breed like rabbits, so some day the heads of the empire would make an excuse for world conquest by saying: "We are overpopulated; it is just that we should ask for room."

Also they were able, through their tight grip over their docile subjects, to plant their immigrants at the strategic points where the empire needed them. When imperial policy felt that there were enough Germans in the United States the sluice gates somehow marvelously closed and the stream flowed elsewhere. Under this policy Germans, so long resident that they escaped the notice of the resident populations, were dropped in every corner of France, Belgium, Italy and England.

German character, as formed under the perverted system of moral education founded by Bismarck and her other empire builders, adapted itself wonderfully to the deeper purposes of this planting process. The average Englishman, Frenchman or American would not like to go among a foreign people with the long set purpose of betraying his neighbors. No reluctance of this kind handicaps the German. The school of ethics in which he was educated—the devil religion of modern Germany—holds that the supreme duty of man is toward the state. And this god of blood and iron requires only one morality of its worshiper—to serve the glory of the state, though

every person therein be poorer, more degraded, less happy because of that service.

And no moral command of Christianity, or any other religion, must stand between the pan-Germanist and his god. For if men must give their souls, if need be, women must give their bodies. That policy of implantation, that education in the sanctity of duplicity, accounts for the success of the German spy system, both before this war began and since; and it also accounts for the machinery of propaganda, by which the psychological board in Berlin gets at the mind of the enemy.

So, in the autumn, the time came when the Germans decided to take charge of the Austrians and eliminate the danger from Italy. The job must have looked like a hard one; the Italian Army occupied an exceptionally good terrain for defense, and it was excellent in organization, in human material, in intelligent direction. The Germans, therefore, tried on it a new method. As an American politician who watched the events of October in Italy expressed it to me: "They didn't shoot bullets; they shot psychology."

When, ten days before the disaster, I visited the Italian Front, I noted a tendency of thought that puzzled me at the time, though it is all plain to me now. Officers and privates would say to me: "Well, I'll see you in Paris at Christmas;" or, "I'll be back to my job in America next winter." "How?" I would ask. "The war will be over in December," they would say; "it's all arranged." Many added: "The peace conference is meeting secretly in Switzerland."

In certain parts of the army this seemed a fixed idea. Of course, I believe now, this insidious idea came from Germanic sources. It was demoniacally clever. An army which believes that the war is settled, over, all arranged, is not going to put the best it has into a fight.

This was general propaganda, a gas cloud. But, as in any intelligent preliminary bombardment, the enemy concentrated on the point where it intended to break

through. This point was not one of the great natural gateways to Italy. Its situation and the lay of the land made it easily defensible; and behind it were reserve positions even more secure. It was not the kind of sector that gives much concern to a general who expects a great attack. Doubtless it was picked for that reason. There, quietly, subtly, the enemy began its psychological drive. The full particulars I do not know—only scattered details.

The Pope's peace note appeared last August. Agents of the enemy, reading into it meanings the Vatican doubtless never intended, talked to the faithful Italian peasants, with their religious feeling and their narrow mental horizon. "Why do you fight?" they said. "Don't you know the Holy Father wills peace?" The Socialist or pretended Socialist agents approached their own kind, telling them that the workingmen of Austria and Germany wanted peace; that all were ready to lay down their arms together.

They harped on the illusion that England and France—especially England—were keeping up this war in order to get a grip on Italy. Austrian deserters, loaded with instructions before they deserted, assisted in the plot. They came over declaring that the comrades on the other side of the trench line wanted peace; that at the first movement of an attack they would throw down their arms and greet the Italians as brothers. Aeroplanes dropped pamphlets emphasizing all these points.

BY TRICK AND STRATEGY

Newspapers came very irregularly to these mountain passes. Suddenly, all along the Front, someone distributed copies of fake Roman and provincial newspapers, so made up and printed that they looked like the real thing, even to the advertisements and the local items. They carried on their front pages the news of a starving Italy, and of bread riots in their own home towns, which had been put down, with heavy slaughter of women and children, by French and British troops! I need not say that all this was false.

By now an attack, for some time expected by the Italians, was on—or, rather, the preliminary bombardments and shifting curtain fires of such an attack. It seemed to be strongest near Tolmino, one of the dangerous gateways to Italy; and the picked troops there were standing beautifully. It was known, also, that several German divisions were stiffening the Austrians. The battle grew to a semblance of a real attack by October 23, on which day, as I myself can witness, the shelling of back lines was violent, even so far as Monfalcone, on the sea.

Then, on October 24, picked German troops, the best she had, hurled themselves against the bodies of Italians on whom Germany had turned the preliminary bombardment of propaganda.

What happened we shall not know until the story of this war is painstakingly pieced together from reports and memoirs. In substance this body of troops opened up and let the enemy through. Confused details have pierced the mists that lie over a disaster of the kind. Whole companies rose from the trenches and, in spite of their frantic officers, rushed, with outstretched hands, to greet their advancing “brothers,” who passed them without a word and charged on toward the reserve lines.

The thing seems to have been wonderfully stage-managed. Before the advancing troops, I understand, scurried Austrians from the Irredentia who spoke perfect Italian, and who were costumed as Italian staff officers. Rushing into the gun emplacements and reserve trenches, they shouted orders for an instant retirement: *Sauve qui peut!* The reserves, in turn, opened up and let the Germans through. Almost unopposed, they poured into the valley of the Upper Isonzo; with rifles, with machine guns, with field artillery they took in the rear the left wing of that valiant Second Army which had, in August, taken so heroically the Bainsizza Plateau and Monte Santo.

Tangled up in mountains higher and more precipitous than the Catskills, to which they had hauled their guns by

days and weeks of painful labor, what could they do? The left wing of the Second Army was virtually lost. The right wing was saved by the bersaglieri, those valiant marching troops who wear the broad sombrero and the burst of cock's plumes. Charging again and again into annihilation, but never ceasing to charge while they lived, they held back the tide until the right wing could roll back on Cividale and the plain. All that Italy had battered out of Austria in two years became untenable.

PROPAGANDA IN AMERICA

The Third Army, holding along the Carso from Gorizia to the sea, was saved, with most of its guns, by an action of cavalry as heroic as the charge of the bersaglieri. Before an orderly battle line could be restored, much more, including the Venetian Plain to the Tagliamento, became untenable, in its turn. And all this was not because of better or bigger forces or superior military strategy, but because of a subtle propaganda, applied to just one little sector of one of the best armies in this whole desperate game!

Well, it pulled Italy together; it had that minor advantage. And the German propaganda failed, I think, of its final objective. The Germans never intended that it should stop where it did. They expected, rather, to undermine the moral force of the whole nation—to make Italy a Russia. They showed that by their procedure in the days following the victory. Some of the first prisoners they took were filled up and turned loose. "We don't want you," they said to these men; "the war is over. Go home and tell your people that if they don't fight us any more they may have their country back, just as it was! We have come to rescue you from England and France."

No sooner had the enemy cavalry occupied Udine, formerly the Italian headquarters city, and hoisted its standard on the citadel, than the newly established German governor issued a proclamation to the same effect.


It was the Italian version of the peace-without-annexations-and-indemnities lie used with such effect against Russia.

But the board of psychology failed, as Germans usually fail, to read the alien mind to the bottom. It did not know—for it had fooled itself—that the true heart of Italy was in this war. It did not count on pride, that governing motive with the Latin. It did not understand that free men, on their own invaded soil, will fight like tigers.

The board of propaganda is shooting psychology at us also; I know that, though I am in touch with my own country now only by means of the newspapers. And the ammunition, I perceive, is the same. Indeed, some of that brand was fired at me last summer by camouflaged German propagandists in Switzerland: Why fight? Let us have peace! England, the villain, is keeping up this war in order to strangle us! The war is almost over, anyway—why fight?

As in Italy, the Germans need only light the torch and hand it on. Well-intentioned people, quite honest, quite untreasonable, will carry it for them. In the newspapers appear now and then the names of some of my own friends, above suspicion of dishonesty—financial or intellectual—who are helping, with all the sincerity of high purpose, in this German game.

Besides which, German propagandists are probably walking our streets by thousands, keeping within the letter of the law, but spreading, without hindrance, the ideas engendered in Berlin.







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